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Judicial Independence              
at Twilight 
Charles Gardner Geyh† 
Abstract 
Judicial independence is a fixture of American government, but its 
structure has never been fully understood. As long as the federal 
judiciary has survived episodic attacks with its independence intact, 
there has been no pressing need to know how or why. But a confluence 
of cyclical, sustained, and sudden developments now threatens the 
federal judiciary’s autonomy in arguably unprecedented ways and 
demands a more comprehensive analysis of judicial independence and 
its vulnerabilities. This article begins by reconceptualizing the 
structure of judicial independence in three tiers. At the apex is an 
ancient, Rule of Law Paradigm, which proceeds from the premise that 
independence enables judges to set extralegal influences aside and 
impartially uphold the law. In the middle tier is Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, via which the framers implemented the Rule of Law 
Paradigm in a rudimentary way. At the base tier are informal 
constitutional conventions that emerged over time to fill gaps in the 
constitutional design and guide the political branches in their 
relationship with the courts in a manner consistent with Article III and 
the overarching paradigm. Next, the article explains how this three-
tiered structure came into being, how it evolved, later eroded, and how 
it recently began to collapse with the repudiation of judicial-
independence conventions in a neo-populist age that is sweeping the 
globe. It attributes the long-term erosion of support for judicial 
independence to the crumbling Rule of Law Paradigm and its 
increasingly antiquated premise that independent judges impartially 
uphold the law, unsullied by ideological and other influences. It 
recommends a gradual shift to what I call a Legal Culture Paradigm, 
which reframes and defends the role of judicial independence in a 
government with a judiciary whose judges are deeply acculturated to 
take law seriously but who are nonetheless subject to extralegal 
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influences at the margins, where operative law is indeterminate. It 
argues, however, that a reboot of the prevailing paradigm cannot, by 
itself, quiet the fury firing the ongoing, neo-populist assault on judicial 
independence, because the judiciary and its autonomy have become 
little more than pawns subject to sacrifice in a high-stakes chess game 
played by polarized, partisan political leaders for the future of American 
Democracy. The article concludes that realistic hope for an accord that 
restores judicial-independence conventions, guided by a new paradigm, 
must follow a period of destabilizing, no-holds-barred, partisan combat, 
in much the same way that settlement in contentious civil cases can 
often be achieved only after a period of exhausting and unrestrained 
hardball litigation. 
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Judicial politics has recently morphed from a board game to a full 
contact sport. In 2016, Democrats accused the Republican Senate 
majority of stealing a Supreme Court seat after the Senate refused to 
schedule a hearing for President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, 
thereby preserving the vacancy for President Trump to fill.1 The next 
year, the Republican Senate majority exercised the “nuclear option” of 
stripping the minority of power to filibuster Supreme Court confir–
mations, after the Senate Democratic majority did the same to their 
Republican counterparts in lower court confirmation proceedings six 
years earlier.2 In 2017, the Chairman of the Federalist Society’s Board 
of Directors coauthored a memo to Congress urging it to double the 
size of the circuit courts and pack them with conservative partisans, 
while Democratic leaders have since proposed to increase the size of the 
Supreme Court and pack it with liberal partisans when they return to 
power.3 For his part, President Trump campaigned to discredit the 
“disgraceful” and “political” machinations of “so-called” judges and 
“Obama judges” who issued rulings impeding his initiatives, prompting 
an extraordinary rebuke by the Chief Justice, and a retaliatory flurry 
of counterpunches from the President.4 
Legal scholars have responded to this “crisis of legitimacy” with an 
array of “radical” recommendations.5 Examples include proposals to: 
 
1. Erick Trickey, The History of “Stolen” Supreme Court Seats, Smithsonian 
Magazine (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/ 
history-stolen-supreme-court-seats-180962589/ [https://perma.cc/YJ6D-Q 
T8E]. 
2. Glenn Thrush, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear” to Speed Up Trump 
Confirmations, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/04/03/us/politics/senate-republicans-nuclear-option.html [https:// 
perma.cc/U374-FE4U]. 
3. Linda Greenhouse, A Conservative Plan to Weaponize the Federal Courts, 
N.Y. Times (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opin 
ion/conservatives-weaponize-federal-courts.html [https://perma.cc/H3QS-2 
AQJ] (discussing Federalist Society proposal); Burgess Everett & Marianne 
Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, Politico (Mar. 
18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-dem 
ocrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/4L Y3-8PBW]. 
4. See infra Part III.B.3. 
5. Amanda Frost, Academic Highlight: Epps and Sitaraman on How to Save 
the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 18, 2018, 4:15 PM), https:// 
www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/academic-highlight-epps-and-sitaraman-on-
how-to-save-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/U8KV-JZAV]. 
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limit the terms of the Court’s justices;6 subject the justices to popular 
election; 7  establish an explicitly partisan Court comprised of half 
Democrats and half Republicans8; and select a rotating Supreme Court 
by lottery drawn from the ranks of the lower courts.9 
These are fascinating and provocative proposals that force us to 
rethink the role of the Supreme Court in American government. As 
radical proposals, however, their prospects for implementation are poor, 
which effectively relegates them to the realm of thought experiments. 
Moreover, with exceptions, scholars have fixated on challenges curr–
ently confronting the Supreme Court with insufficient heed to the 
broader context in which those challenges have arisen. This broader 
context embraces the structure, history, culture and politics of an 
independent judiciary—including but not limited to the Supreme 
Court—an appreciation for which is critical to charting a more nuanced 
and practical course forward that I propose here. 
Judicial independence has been a defining feature of the American 
Constitutional landscape for centuries. It has been theorized in light of 
its objectives, taxonomized with reference to its forms, and described 
in relation to its conjoined twin, judicial accountability. The structure 
of judicial independence, however, has never been fully explained or 
understood. As long as the foundations of judicial independence have 
remained sound and the structure has been adequate to support the 
weight of episodic attacks, there has been no urgent need to fully 
understand why or how. But that is changing due to developments that 
are variously cyclical, sustained, and (as described at the outset of this 
article) sudden. These developments threaten the future of an 
independent judiciary in unprecedented ways, and counsel the need for 
a deeper and more systematic evaluation of judicial independence and 
its vulnerabilities that this article seeks to supply. 
The powers that the U.S. Constitution delegates to the three 
branches of government enable each branch to make the others 
miserable. If he were so inclined, the President could decline to execute 
congressional enactments, defy court orders, and deploy the military to 
consolidate his power. Congress could slash appropriations to the 
executive and judicial branches and impeach insubmissive Presidents 
and judges. The judiciary could drive the executive and legislative 
 
6. Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court 
Nomination Process 175 (2005). 
7. Id. at 174. 
8. Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the 
United States Supreme Court, 45 Pepp. L. Rev. 547, 550 (2018). 
9. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 
Yale L.J. 148, 181–84 (2019). 
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branches into constitutional crisis via unbridled resort to judicial 
review. 
Apocalyptic scenarios such as these have materialized rarely, if 
ever. Proceeding from James Madison’s premise that “[a]mbition must 
be made to counteract ambition,”10 the framers embedded checks and 
balances into the constitutional design to equip each branch with the 
means to thwart attempted usurpations of power by the other two, 
which, the theory goes, have operated as a deterrent. 
That said, those who peddled the proposed Constitution to the 
fledgling states did not conceive of the three branches as coequal in 
power. Rather, Alexander Hamilton characterized the judiciary as 
“least dangerous” because it possessed powers of neither sword nor 
purse. 11  In the abstract, Hamilton would seem to be right: if one 
conjured a new “Survivor” reality television series involving three 
contestants, each with an exclusive power—one who could shoot things, 
one who could buy things, and one who could declare things—the smart 
money would not ride on the survival of declare-things guy. A 
competitor who snubs the guy who shoots things, or the guy who buys 
things, risks being shot or starved; but the guy who declares things can 
be ignored with impunity unless one or both of the other two has his 
back. 
To the extent that the judiciary has emerged, evolved, and endured 
as a separate, independent, and ultimately powerful branch of 
government, despite its vulnerabilities, it is because the people and the 
public officials who represent them have collectively willed it to be so. 
The collective will is embodied in a deeply rooted Rule of Law Paradigm 
that has guided the framing of the U.S. Constitution and structured 
the judiciary’s role in relation to the other branches of government. 
That paradigm, in a nutshell, posits that judges who are afforded 
independence from the so-called “political” branches will exercise 
judicial power by setting aside extralegal influences and impartially 
upholding the law in their capacity as courts.12 
The Rule of Law Paradigm acknowledges that judges should be 
accountable to Congress (in extreme situations) for treason, bribery, 
and other high crimes and misdemeanors, via the impeachment process. 
It accepts that judges should be accountable to “the law,” in the sense 
that their decisions are subject to appellate processes, constitutional 
amendments, legislative overrides, oaths of office, and the dictates of 
conscience. But the paradigm’s conception of accountability is sharply 
limited and does not envision that judges should be answerable to the 
 
10. The Federalist No. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (George W. Cary & 
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
11. The Federalist No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001). 
12. See infra, Section II.B. (discussing the Rule of Law Paradigm). 
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public or political branches for the choices they make, which would be 
antithetical to the independent judiciary that the Rule of Law 
Paradigm seeks to protect and promote. 
The Rule of Law Paradigm maps on a constitutional structure 
strewn with gaps and ambiguities that the political branches could 
exploit to impose their will on the judiciary in a manner contrary to 
the paradigm’s tenets. To complement the Rule of Law Paradigm, then, 
an array of conventions has evolved over time to fill gaps, clarify 
ambiguities, and structure the exercise of political branch power in a 
manner consistent with the paradigm and Article III, which together 
give rise to a custom of respect for judicial independence. 
In Part I of this article, I overview the structure of judicial 
independence, beginning with a synopsis of the provisions in the U.S. 
Constitution that bear on the relative independence and accountability 
of judges and the federal judiciary. These provisions are akin to a list 
of parts for a machine that is unaccompanied by instructions for 
assembly. And so, I supplement the parts list with a corollary to an 
instruction manual that explains how these parts are assembled into a 
three-tiered structure (organized by tiers moving from general to 
specific). On the top tier of that structure is the Rule of Law Paradigm 
that conceptualizes the role of judicial independence in American 
government. On the second tier is the U.S. Constitution, with its 
limited provision for an independent judiciary, the meaning of and 
support for which are guided and sustained by the overarching 
paradigm that the constitution embodies. On the third tier are consti–
tutional conventions informally established and applied by the political 
branches over time. These conventions fill gaps in the constitutional 
design and provide additional protection for judicial independence 
consistent with the paradigm. Taken together, these discrete 
conventions have given rise to a custom of respect for the judiciary’s 
autonomy, or “customary independence,” that the political branches 
have, for the most part, respected. 
In Part II, I trace the history of judicial independence across periods 
of establishment, evolution, and erosion. During the period of 
establishment (which I denominate Judicial Independence 1.0), the 
framers aspired to create an independent judiciary in Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution. Due to inattention and inexperience, however, they 
did not fully appreciate the extent to which other powers that the 
Constitution delegated to Congress and the President could be 
exploited to undermine the independent judiciary they sought to 
establish. 
During the period of evolution (Judicial Independence 2.0), 
beginning in the early nineteenth century, discrete independence 
conventions emerged and evolved to constrain political branch 
encroachments on the judiciary’s autonomy, in a manner consistent 
with the overarching Rule of Law Paradigm. These conventions came 
to deter congress from retaliating against judges for unpopular rulings 
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by means of impeachment, budget cuts, salary freezes, or court-packing. 
They gave rise to standard operating procedures in judicial 
confirmation proceedings that encouraged deliberation and compro–
mise, to the end of promoting a stable and independent judiciary 
deserving of public confidence. And they discouraged Presidents from 
openly defying court orders and undermining the judiciary’s legitimacy 
for partisan gain. 
During the period of erosion, beginning in the early twentieth 
century (Judicial Independence 3.0), the emerging social science of 
judicial decision-making, the changing politics of federal judicial 
appointments, and the shifting media coverage of the courts, have 
combined to render judges’ professed imperviousness to extralegal 
influences increasingly hypocritical-seeming, to the detriment of public 
confidence in the Rule of Law Paradigm. This period of erosion 
manifested a new skepticism of judicial autonomy driven by an 
emerging concern that independence is less a shield from external 
sources of intimidation that enables judges to uphold the law, than a 
weapon that insulates judges from accountability and enables them to 
disregard the law and substitute their ideological and other preferences. 
Part III describes the dawn of a new era—a period of convention 
collapse (Judicial Independence 4.0). If the period of erosion was a slow-
burning brush fire that encroached on the Rule of Law Paradigm 
gradually over time, then the period of collapse is a Molotov cocktail 
that exploded in the age of Trump, and blew open a door to a more 
populist form of leadership that has little patience for an independent 
judiciary obstructing its agenda. 
The era of convention collapse in Judicial Independence 4.0 is not 
about President Trump per se. It is about democracy fatigue, born of 
growing dissatisfaction with American government generally, which 
contributes to disenchantment with the judiciary. It is about anti-
elitism, which has fueled distrust of the career politicians and life-
tenured, “expert” judges responsible for a government increasingly 
viewed as broken. It is about a wave of neo-populism that world leaders 
(including but not limited to Donald Trump) are riding, in which 
democracy fatigue and anti-elitism have buoyed popular support for 
self-proclaimed men or women of the people, who have consolidated 
executive power by punishing dissent within the ranks of their own 
political party and diminishing the capacity of the other branches to 
keep the executive in check. And it is about political polarization, as 
growing, factionalized distrust of and hatred for the opposing political 
party have engendered distrust of and hatred for judges nominated and 
confirmed by the opposing political party, which has undermined diffuse 
support for courts generally. 
Whereas the earlier period of erosion was marked by crumbling 
support for the Rule of Law Paradigm, the new period of collapse 
threatens the discrete micro-conventions that comprise customary 
independence. President Trump unified Republican Party support for 
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a more openly partisan judiciary, which elicited an equal and opposite 
reaction from congressional Democrats. As a consequence, serious 
partisans on the left and right proposed to pack the Supreme and lower 
courts. Senate majorities from both political parties repudiated time-
honored procedural conventions that promoted consensus and compro–
mise in confirmation proceedings. The President, in turn, abrogated a 
convention against attacking the legitimacy of the federal courts and 
flirted with challenging a convention against defying Supreme Court 
orders. 
For one who respects the role of an independent judiciary in a 
tripartite system of government, the period of erosion during Judicial 
Independence 3.0 was troubling, and the period of collapse in Judicial 
Independence 4.0 is alarming. These two stages in the development of 
judicial independence have different causes and effects but are related 
in an important way. Eroding support for judicial independence in the 
Rule of Law Paradigm—the defining feature of the period of erosion—
has enabled independence conventions to topple in the era of collapse 
by weakening the foundation upon which those conventions have rested. 
Accordingly, Part IV calls for a two-track approach to reform. One 
track remediates long-term erosion of support for an independent 
judiciary in the Rule of Law Paradigm. The second track addresses the 
latest assault on judicial-independence conventions. 
With respect to the first track, I argue that gradual diminution of 
support for judicial independence during the period of erosion in 
Judicial Independence 3.0 is attributable to stress fractures in the 
antiquated Rule of Law Paradigm—a paradigm that should be 
jettisoned in favor of a more defensible Legal Culture Paradigm. The 
Legal Culture Paradigm I propose posits that judges are acculturated 
to take the law seriously—first as law students, then as lawyers, and 
later as judges. The inevitability of legal indeterminacy, however, 
requires judges to exercise judgment and discretion informed by a range 
of extralegal influences, including the judge’s policy perspectives. 
Judicial independence remains essential to a Legal Culture Paradigm, 
because it enables judges to follow the law and administer justice as 
they are acculturated to do, even if they are subject to extralegal 
influences at the margins. Yet because the Legal Culture Paradigm 
acknowledges the inevitability of extralegal influence on judicial 
decision-making, it contemplates a more robust role for accountability 
to ensure that judges do not abuse their independence in pursuit of 
personal agendas. 
As to the second track, those who have brought Judicial 
Independence 4.0’s era of collapse into being include good faith actors 
who are understandably doubtful of the Rule of Law Paradigm and its 
premise that independent judges find facts and follow law unsullied by 
extralegal influences. But they also include opportunists determined to 
exploit public skepticism for tactical gain to the end of peopling the 
judiciary with partisan soulmates and weakening the courts as a check 
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on political-branch power. Countering forces that include ingenuous 
and disingenuous actors, calls into play a strategy akin to that often 
used by parties in civil litigation: hardball, followed by settlement. 
Thwarting those who are hell-bent to recreate the courts in their 
own partisan image or to marginalize the judiciary’s capacity to keep 
Congress and the President in check leaves court defenders with no 
alternative but to adopt the standard litigation tactic of fighting 
hardball with hardball. Cycles of excessive, anti-court vitriol aimed at 
commandeering control of the judiciary have come and gone throughout 
our history and have been blunted by court defenders rising up and 
fighting to protect the prevailing paradigm and the judicial-
independence conventions that the paradigm has spawned against 
encroachment. In the context of the ongoing era of collapse, however, 
hardball in defense of an independent judiciary may require more than 
defending crumbling judicial-independence conventions from further 
attack. Importuning those who have caused and profited from the 
collapse of independence conventions, to restore and respect the very 
conventions they have flouted, is an asymmetric form of hardball that 
is destined to fail because convention-busters who are indifferent, if not 
hostile, to customary independence have no incentive to yield. 
Consequently—and this is more of a prediction than a recommen–
dation—things must get worse before they can get better. The neo-
populist political right, which has consolidated power in part by 
overriding judicial-independence conventions for partisan gain, is 
unlikely to relent unless and until the center-left pushes back in equal 
and opposite measure, creating a convention vacuum that is too chaotic 
(and too inimical of independence norms) for either side to sustain. 
Hardball on this order of magnitude is perilous and exhausting, and 
makes a companion, litigation-like strategy of pursuing negotiated 
settlement increasingly attractive. To that end, I propose a series of tri-
branch summits—a proposal with ancient roots dating back to James 
Madison’s failed proposal for a Council of Revision—for the purpose of 
diminishing inter-branch schisms, restoring paths of communication, 
and rebuilding independence conventions, guided by the proposed Legal 
Culture Paradigm. It is premature to convene tri-branch summits until 
the disputants are receptive to listening to each other and discussing 
the prospects for accord. There is, however, cause for cautious optimism 
that the current appeal of the biblical edict, “[an] eye for [an] eye,”13 
will eventually yield to the wisdom of a warning attributed to Mahatma 
Gandhi, that “an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.”14 
Judicial independence is in a “twilight” that can precede either 
darkness or dawn. If the long and recently accelerated campaign to 
curtail judicial independence is left uncorrected, a gradual fade to black 
 
13. Leviticus 24:19–21. 
14. Fred R. Shapiro, The Yale Book of Quotations 269–70 (2006). 
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seems likely, and perhaps desirable, insofar as the erosion and collapse 
of an independent judiciary signifies that it has outlived its usefulness. 
To the extent, however, that judicial independence can, and as argued 
here, should, be revitalized with a modified paradigm and a restoration 
of constitutional conventions following period of turmoil, the prospects 
for a brighter future improve significantly. 
I. The Structure of Judicial Independence
15
 
The structure of judicial independence in the federal courts is a 
topic best addressed in two stages. The obvious starting place is with 
the text of the U.S. Constitution and its provisions for an independent 
and accountable judiciary. It quickly becomes clear, however, that 
confining a discussion of judicial independence to the Constitution alone 
is inadequate to explain judicial independence and its scope because 
gaps in the constitutional structure could be exploited to obliterate an 
independent judiciary in all but name only. The second stage in the 
analysis thus requires that the Constitution be understood as part of a 
more elaborate architecture, sandwiched between the Rule of law 
Paradigm that animated the constitutional design and less formal 
constitutional conventions that implemented the constitutional design 
in light of the prevailing paradigm. 
A. The Constitutional Structure and its Gaps 
When it comes to the federal judiciary’s independence and account–
ability, the conventional starting point in the analysis is the United 
States Constitution. 
The “independence” side of the ledger includes: 1) the good 
behavior clause, which guarantees judges tenure during “good 
[b]ehaviour” and thereby insulates them from independence-threatening 
reappointment or reelection; 16  2) the compensation clause, which 
deprives Congress of the power to constrain judicial independence via 
retaliatory cuts to judicial salaries;17 3) the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, which guarantees litigants a hearing before an 
 
15. In an important article entitled The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 
Professor Stephen Burbank discusses the theoretical underpinnings of 
judicial independence in relation to judicial accountability. Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
315, 339–40 (1999). I use the term “structure,” in lieu of “architecture” here, 
to describe the tiered structures that promote and protect judicial 
independence. 
16. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
17. Id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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independent judge;18 4) the suspension clause, which buffers the federal 
courts from political branch encroachment by prohibiting suspension of 
federal court authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, except “when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it;”19 
5) the judicial power clause, which grants the federal courts a monopoly 
on judicial power that offers the judicial branch a measure of indepen–
dence from political branch encroachment on judicial functions;20 and 
6) structural separation of government into three independent (if also 
interdependent) branches.21 
On the accountability side are congressional powers: 1) to impeach 
and remove judicial officers, which Alexander Hamilton, writing as 
Publius, characterized as the primary means the Constitution supplied 
to ensure the “responsibility” of judges; 22  2) to establish (and by 
negative implication, disestablish) inferior courts, which has been 
construed to authorize congressional regulation of court practice, 
procedure, administration, structure, and size, each of which can 
conceivably be used as carrots or sticks;23 3) to regulate the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, which arguably subsumes the authority 
to constrain an uncooperative Court’s judicial power;24 4) to tax and 
spend in relation to the judiciary’s budget and salary increases;25 and 
5) to implement the foregoing powers by means “necessary and 
proper,” which arguably authorizes supplemental powers to constrain 
or control.26 In addition, the Constitution delegates to the Senate the 
power to consent to the appointment of federal judges, which enables 
it to exercise a form of prospective accountability by limiting the 
judicial workforce to judges it deems capable, qualified, and likely to 
render decisions the Senate regards as politically acceptable.27 
 
18. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and 
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 476 (1986); U.S. 
Const. amend. V. 
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
20. Id. art. III, § 1. 
21. Id. art. I–III. See also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation 
of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393, 415–19 
(1996). 
22. The Federalist No. 79, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001). 
23. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941); 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–74 (1965). 
24. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
25. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
26. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
27. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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The President, in turn, has two powers germane to judicial 
accountability: 1) “[t]he” executive power, paired with the duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” which give the 
President the raw power, if not the constitutional authority, to enforce 
or marginalize court orders as he sees fit and defy those he deems 
unconstitutional;28 and 2) the power to nominate judges, which, like 
the Senate power to confirm judicial nominees, gives the President a 
form of prospective accountability that enables him to limit the pool of 
future judges to those who are more likely to be simpatico and less 
likely to get in his way.29 
Making sense of the balance the Constitution strikes between 
judicial independence and accountability is compromised by questions 
the drafters and their boosters left unresolved. Five examples illustrate 
the challenge. 
First, in Federalist 79, Alexander Hamilton opined that 
impeachment is the “only provision on the point [concerning ‘pre–
cautions’ for the ‘responsibility’ of judges] which is consistent with the 
necessary independence of the judicial character, and is the only one 
which we find in our own constitution in respect to our own judges.”30 
James Madison’s notes of the constitutional convention reveal that the 
delegates devoted almost no debate to the impeachment clauses in 
relation to judges.31 During the ratification debates, Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists agreed that impeachment would be available to deter 
or remedy “deliberate usurpations” of judicial power animated by 
“wicked or corrupt motives.”32 They likewise agreed that impeachment 
would not address “errors in judgment,” or “misconstructions and 
contraventions of the will of the legislature”—a state of affairs that 
bothered the Anti-Federalist Brutus, but not the Federalist Hamilton.33 
No one, however, discussed the possibilities that Congress could 
encroach on judicial independence by mischaracterizing errors as 
usurpations, by disregarding the distinction altogether, or by using 
threats of impeachment to intimidate. 
Second, Article III, Section 1, which delegates to Congress the 
power to establish lower federal courts (or not), was a compromise 
 
28. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3. 
29. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
30. Federalist 79, supra note 22, at 409–10. 
31. James Madison, Notes (Aug. 27, 1787), in 2 The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787, at 426–28 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). 
32. The Federalist No. 81, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary 
& James McClellan eds., 2001); Brutus, The Power of the Judiciary (Mar. 
20, 1788), in The Antifederalist Papers 222–24 (Morton Borden ed., 
1965). 
33. Brutus, supra note 32; Federalist 81, supra note 32. 
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between those delegates who wanted to enshrine inferior federal courts 
in the Constitution and those who wanted no such courts at all.34 
Whether the power to establish courts included the powers to 
disestablish such courts and constrain their institutional autonomy 
through regulation (for example, by manipulating court practice, 
procedure, structure, size, administration and jurisdiction), was an issue 
left for later generations to untangle. 
Third, the framers understood that they had denied the judiciary 
the power of the purse, which, in Hamilton’s view, rendered the 
judiciary less “dangerous.”35 But there is no indication that the framers 
considered the extent to which congressional power to manipulate 
judicial budgets could encroach on independence in ways comparable 
to manipulating the salaries they thought to protect. 
Fourth, at the constitutional convention, the delegates devoted 
considerable debate to the implications of dividing the appointment 
power between President and Senate.36 But no thought was publicly 
expressed to suggest that the President’s power to nominate or the 
Senate’s power to confirm could be used to constrain decisional 
independence by extracting views, if not assurances, from nominees as 
to how they would decide future cases as judges. 
Fifth, it was self-evident that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
empowered Congress to determine the size of the Supreme Court 
because the Constitution established a Supreme Court without 
specifying the number of justices to comprise it.37 But the possibility 
that the power to control Court size included the power to manipulate 
the composition of the Court’s decision-making majority appears not to 
have been considered. 
Embarking on the constitutional adventure with these issues 
unresolved, and often unrecognized, created an array of quasi-political 
questions for Congress and the President to answer over time. I use 
“quasi-political questions” to signify those issues that may or may not 
be nonjusticiable per se, but which, for reasons related to text, 
precedent, institutional competence, inter-branch comity, and political 
prudence, the courts have afforded Congress and the President a 
heightened degree of interpretive deference. Congressional oversight of 
the federal courts is awash in such questions. The Supreme Court has 
expressly denominated questions concerning congressional inter–
 
34. Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts & Congress Collide: The 
Struggle for Control of America’s Judicial System 43 (2006) 
[hereinafter When Courts & Congress Collide]. 
35. Federalist 78, supra note 11. 
36. James Madison, Notes (June 5, 1787), in 1 The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 119–22, 126 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). 
37. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.; id. art. III, § 1. 
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pretation of the impeachment clauses “political;” 38  deferred to 
congressional regulation of court practice and procedure as plenary;39 
acceded to legislation directing justices of the Supreme Court to serve 
as roving trial judges, given the Court’s “practice and acquiescence” 
under the statute for the preceding fourteen years;40 genuflected to 
legislation effectively removing circuit judges by disestablishing their 
courts because “there are no words in the constitution to prohibit or 
restrain the exercise of legislative power” to establish inferior 
tribunals;41 acquiesced to Congress’s authority to thwart judicial review 
by stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear a pending case;42 
and abided by statutes subjecting the Supreme Court to disqualification 
standards and financial disclosure rules, despite what the Chief Justice 
has characterized as the uncertain constitutional status of such 
measures.43 
B. The Three-Tiered Structure of Judicial Independence 
If Congress were so inclined, then, these quasi-political interpretive 
spaces would seem to afford it the discretion to destroy the judicial 
independence that the framers thought they were creating. What does 
tenure during good behavior achieve if Congress can disestablish an 
uncooperative judge’s office or arbitrarily characterize her behavior as 
an impeachable crime and have her removed? What is the benefit of a 
salary that cannot be diminished if Congress can eliminate a judge’s 
operating budget, deny her cost-of-living adjustments, or double her 
workload? That said, the limits of Congress’s constitutional authority 
to manhandle the courts remains uncertain because the successful 
attempts have been old and few, which raises the question of why. 
The answer begins prior to the establishment of the Constitution, 
with an emerging conceptual model or paradigm of the government that 
the founding generation sought to establish and operationalize 
imperfectly in its charter. The persistence of that model has enabled 
later generations to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the 
 
38. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233 (1993). 
39. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 
1, at 9–10. 
40. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
41. Id. 
42. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1869) (“We are not at liberty to 
inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its 
power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the 
appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”). 
43. 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6–7 (2011), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M5EC-F8G5]. 
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constitutional structure via constitutional conventions, in a manner 
more or less consistent with the overarching paradigm. 
I have previously referred to this model as “the Rule of Law 
Paradigm” (ROLP).44 The rule of law, in its most rudimentary form, 
proceeds from the premise that people enjoy certain fundamental rights 
that are better protected by a fixed body of self-imposed laws than by 
the whims of an autocrat. In the West, the rule of law germinated from 
seeds planted by the ancient Greeks that went dormant following the 
collapse of the Roman Empire, blossomed anew during the High Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, and returned to full flower during the Enlighten–
ment with the writings of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and 
Charles Montesquieu, among others.45 Those writers, in turn, influenced 
the thinking of those who framed the U.S. Constitution.46 The ROLP, 
as I describe it here, is a model that guided the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution and their successors on how best to implement the rule of 
law. 
With respect to the judiciary, the framers sought to implement a 
ROLP in a rudimentary way. They meant to equip the judiciary with 
the means to uphold the law on a case-by-case basis by establishing a 
separate judicial branch armed with exclusive authority to exercise 
“the” judicial power.47 They meant to protect federal judges from public 
and political branch intimidation—thereby enabling them to set 
extralegal influences aside and uphold the law—by providing for federal 
judges to be appointed, rather than elected, and affording them 
independence via special tenure and salary protections.48 To keep the 
other branches in check, those who lobbied the states to ratify the 
proposed constitution argued that the judicial power federal courts 
exercise would include the power to declare acts of the other branches 
unconstitutional.49 And in anticipation of the concern that life-tenured 
judges might abuse the power of judicial review, cheerleaders for the 
proposed Constitution argued that the threat of impeachment operated 
as an adequate cross-check.50 
 
44. Charles Gardner Geyh, Courting Peril: The Political Transfor–
mation of the American Judiciary 16–23 (2016). 
45. Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, 
Theory 51, 53–54 (2004). 
46. Id. See also David M. Kirkham, European Sources of American 
Constitutional Thought Before 1787, 3 U.S. A.F. Acad. J. Legal Stud. 
1, 17–22 (1992) (describing the impact of European thinkers on the 
American framers). 
47. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
48. Id. 
49. See Federalist 78, supra note 11. 
50. See The Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Two hundred and thirty years later, the judiciary’s role in the 
ROLP, and the centrality of judicial independence to that role, are oft 
repeated as a virtual mantra. “The strength of our democracy and the 
maintenance of the rule of law lie in the independence and impartiality 
of our judiciary,” Former American Bar Association President Paulette 
Brown has declared.51 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has 
elaborated that “judicial independence revolves around the theme of 
how to assure that judges decide according to law, rather than 
according to their own whims or to the will of the political branches of 
government.” 52  Wisconsin Chief Justice and past President of the 
Conference of Chief Justices, Shirley Abrahamson, has echoed that 
“‘judicial independence’ embodies the concept that a judge decides cases 
fairly, impartially, and according to the facts and law, not according to 
whim, prejudice, or fear, the dictates of the legislature or executive, or 
the latest opinion poll.”53 There are many others.54 
Although the framers codified the emerging ROLP in the 
Constitution—a point that modern-day paradigm boosters never tire of 
repeating—they did so incompletely and imperfectly. To fill gaps and 
clarify ambiguities, constitutional conventions emerged and evolved 
over time to guide Congress and the President in their resolution of 
quasi-political questions in a manner consistent with the prevailing 
ROLP. With qualifications, most scholars have embraced constitutional 
conventions as a useful and important way for the political branches to 
regularize their operations and resolve quasi-political questions that the 
 
51. ABA President Paulette Brown’s Statement on Judicial Independence and 




52. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 
St. Louis U. L.J. 989, 989 (1996). 
53. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address: Thorny Issues and Slippery 
Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 3, 3 
(2003). 
54. E.g., Samuel L. Bufford, Defining the Rule of Law, Judges’ J., Fall 2007, 
at 16, 20–21 (“Judicial independence is an essential cornerstone of the rule 
of law . . . .”); Julie A. Robinson, Judicial Independence: The Need for 
Education About the Role of the Judiciary, 46 Washburn L.J. 535, 544 
(2007) (“Judicial independence is itself a necessary prescriptive for undue 
influence or external pressures on decision-making.”); Louraine C. Arkfeld, 
The Rule of Law and an Independent Judiciary, Judges’ J., Fall 2007, at 
13 (“A review of the literature reveals little disagreement about the basic 
principles that are vital to a system that guarantees an independent 
judiciary and fair and impartial courts.”). 
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text of the Constitution does not answer, and which are not routinely 
subject to judicial gloss.55 
Conventions are easiest to conceptualize and justify as a political 
branch corollary to court precedent. Like court precedent, consti–
tutional conventions promote efficiency by obviating the need for the 
political branches to reinvent the wheel every time they encounter the 
same question that the Constitution does not answer for them. They 
promote stability in government by eliminating radical uncertainty 
concerning how the branches will operate in relation to the public and 
each other every time there is a transition of political power. They 
promote predictability for the benefit of others within and without the 
government who seek to structure their affairs in anticipation of what 
the political branches will or will not do. They promote institutional 
wisdom, insofar as conventions enable the government to fill cracks in 
the constitutional design with reference to accumulated experience and 
expertise embodied in institutional norms that past generations have 
deemed consistent with the guiding paradigm. By the same token, and 
again like court precedent, when a given convention comes to be 
regarded as unwise or outmoded, it can be rejected or replaced. 
Constitutional conventions are unlike court precedent, however, in 
their lack of formality. Judicial precedent is memorialized in writing by 
courts that are assigned levels in a hierarchical pyramid with the 
Supreme Court of the United States at its apex. The Supreme Court 
has the final authority to declare with relative clarity when a precedent 
is established, what that precedent is, and when it is overturned. 
Constitutional conventions, in contrast, are not memorialized as such, 
or voted upon. Because of their informality, disputes over constitutional 
conventions focus on whether a putative convention actually exists, 
what the scope of that convention is, and how seriously the given 
convention should be taken. 
Ivor Jennings, the godfather of constitutional-convention scholar–
ship, offered a three-part analysis for ascertaining when conventions are 
born: 1) there are precedents for a given practice; 2) there are accepted 
reasons for respecting those precedents; and 3) public officials follow 
 
55. See Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written 
Constitutions, 38 Dublin U. L.J. 387 (2015). Albert notes that not all 
conventions are created equal. For a rule-of-law regime, conventions of 
“incorporation” that fill voids in the constitutional text (like the pre-
Twenty-Second-Amendment norm limiting the President to two terms) 
may be less problematic than conventions of “repudiation” that effectively 
rewrite the Constitution (like sole-executive agreements that enable 
Presidents to make international agreements without Senate consent 
required by the treaty clause in Article II, § 2). The judicial-independence 
conventions at issue here fall into the less problematic, void-filling category. 
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such precedents as binding.56 Josh Chavetz and David Pozen, in turn, 
have theorized that conventions die in one of three ways: 1) when they 
are destroyed, via explicit flouting or repudiation; 2) when they 
decompose, by gradual disuse or neglect; and 3) when they are 
displaced by positive law that obliterates or formalizes a convention.57 
It is one thing to opine on the life cycle of constitutional conventions 
in theory and another to show how given conventions are formed, rise, 
and decline. I turn to the latter task next, focusing on the rise and 
decline of judicial independence micro-conventions that have formed 
under the umbrella of a customary independence macro-convention, the 
support for and survival of which have depended on their role in relation 
to the ROLP. 
II. The Establishment, Evolution, and Erosion of 
Judicial Independence 
Political branch conventions have emerged, evolved, and 
entrenched themselves over time to fill gaps and resolve uncertainties 
in the text of Article III, thereby fostering a custom of judicial 
independence. Congress and the President have (with exceptions) 
respected customary independence, without an explicit directive from 
court orders or the text of the Constitution itself to do so. In this part 
of the article, I periodize the rise and decline of judicial independence 
into its first three phases: establishment; evolution; and erosion. 
A. Judicial Independence 1.0: Establishment 
The founding generation’s first sketch of an independent federal 
judiciary was framed by aspiration, inattention, and inexperience. The 
new English Americans aspired to establish a separate and independent 
judiciary as a means to implement the prevailing ROLP; they were thus 
devoted in principle to judicial independence and establishing a 
separate judicial branch of government. 58  They were familiar with 
English history and the story of English judges, their centuries of 
dependence on the crown, and their hard-fought victory in the 1701 Act 
of Settlement, which granted them tenure during good behavior.59 They 
 
56. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution 136 (5th ed. London, 
1959). 
57. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 
65 UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1435–38 (2018). 
58. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of 
the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 31, 86 
(1998). 
59. Charles Gardner Geyh, Who Is to Judge? The Perennial Debate 
Over Whether to Elect or Appoint America’s Judges 25–27 (2019) 
[hereinafter Who is to Judge]. 
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were acutely aware that colonial judges did not enjoy the same 
independence as their English counterparts, and included that fact 
among the reasons for their declaration of independence.60 And prior to 
the constitutional convention, the young states guarded against judicial 
dependence on the executive branch by shifting control of judicial 
selection and tenure to the legislative branch, which engendered 
problematic judicial dependence on state legislatures.61 The net effect 
of these developments was to create a general consensus in favor of a 
separate and independent judiciary reflected in both the constitutional 
convention62 and ratification debates.63 
 
60. Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in 
the Young Republic 6 (1971) (observing that having colonial judges serve 
at the king’s pleasure “met with stiff resistance from colonial legislatures 
and pamphleteers”); Edward Dumbauld, The Declaration of 
Independence and What it Means Today 115 (1950) (noting that in 
Massachusetts, the dependence of colonial judges on the crown rather than 
the state legislature for their salaries was opposed on the grounds that “it 
was unconstitutional for the judges to be independent of the people and 
dependent on the crown”); The Declaration of Independence para. 11 
(U.S. 1776) (objecting that the King “has made Judges dependent on his 
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of 
their salaries”). 
61. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–
1787, at 161 (1969) (“[G]iving control of the courts and judicial tenure to 
the legislatures actually represented the culmination of what the colonial 
assemblies had been struggling for in their eighteenth-century contests with 
the Crown. The Revolutionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative 
interference in the court structure and in judicial functions, and in fact they 
meant to increase it.”). 
62. For example, Convention Delegate John Dickinson proposed to amend the 
good behavior clause to authorize a judge’s removal by the President upon 
application from both houses of Congress, but the proposal was rejected, 
with John Randolph expressing the sentiments of amendment opponents 
when he said it “weaken[ed] too much the independence of the Judges.” 
Madison, supra note 31, at 428–29. Debate on whether to prohibit upward 
adjustments to judicial salaries featured disputants on each side grounding 
their argument in concern for judicial autonomy. James Madison argued 
that it would be “improper even so far to permit a dependence” of judges 
on Congress for pay increases. James Madison, Notes (July 18, 1787), in 2 
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 31, at 
44–45. Opponents of Madison’s proposal, who won the day, argued that 
given its stature as a separate and independent branch of government, “the 
importance of the Judiciary will require men of the first talents: large 
salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than the U.S. can allow in the 
first instance.” Madison, supra note 31, at 429. 
63. Federalist 78, supra note 11, at 405 (“[N]othing will contribute so much 
as this [permanent tenure of judicial offices] to that independent spirit in 
the judges, which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous 
a duty.”); Federalist 79, supra note 22, at 408 (“Next to permanency in 
office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges, than 
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These lofty aspirations for an independent judiciary, however, were 
compromised by inattention. The founders’ intellectual energy was 
focused on regulating the relationship between the first and second 
branches of the national government—the respective powers of 
Congress and the President, and how those powers would be wielded 
and constrained—which relegated the establishment of the third branch 
to a relative afterthought.64 In his history of the Supreme Court, Julius 
Goebel observed that the delegates’ concern for the judiciary “generally 
came off with little more than an honorable mention.”65 Establishing a 
separate and independent judiciary “was a matter of theoretical 
compulsion rather than of practical necessity,” Goebel explained, as a 
consequence of which the framers acted “more in deference to the 
maxim of separation than in response to clearly formulated ideas about 
the role of a national judicial system.”66 
The perils of inattention were exacerbated by inexperience. Those 
political branch encroachments on judicial independence with which the 
framers had experience were largely limited to threats against judicial 
tenure and salaries of individual judges—threats that the framers duly 
countered in Article III, Section 1. A complaint embedded in the 
Declaration of Independence that the King had “obstructed the Admin–
istration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing 
Judiciary powers,”67 was addressed by establishing a separate judicial 
branch in Article III, armed with “the” judicial power. But the founders 
had no practical experience with political branch encroachments on the 
 
a fixed provision for their support.”); Brutus, supra note 32, at 223 (“I do 
not object to the judges holding their commissions during good behavior. I 
suppose it a proper provision provided they were made properly 
responsible.”); The Federal Farmer, Letter XV: The Judiciary (Jan. 18, 
1788), reprinted in Letters from the Federal Farmer to the 
Republican 97, 99 (Walter Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) (“[I]t is well 
provided, that the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour.”). 
With respect to antifederalist arguments concerning the perils of 
independence on judicial decision-making, see Brutus, supra note 32, at 
223–24 (“[J]udges under this system will be independent in the strict sense 
of the word. . . . There is no power above them that can correct their errors 
or control their decisions.”). 
64. Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 97 (1971). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 206. 
67. Declaration of Independence para. 10 (U.S. 1776). See Richard E. 
Ellis, supra note 60, at 7 (observing that the “central problem” of the 
colonial courts was trying to protect the “judiciary’s independence from the 
encroachments of the Crown and Parliament”); Edward Dumbauld, supra 
note 60, at 115 (explaining that Massachusetts acted swiftly to declare it 
unconstitutional for judges to receive money from the crown).  
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judiciary as a separate department of government because in England 
and the colonies the judiciary, as an institution, was neither separate 
nor independent but an extension of the Crown.68 When, in 1787, 
convention delegates created a separate judicial branch in Article III 
and empowered Congress to establish inferior courts (or not), the 
possibility that Congress and the President could exploit such power to 
disestablish those courts, control their operations, and undermine the 
judiciary’s autonomy, went unexplored, and would remain unexplored 
for the next fourteen years.69 
In 1801, when the outgoing Federalists were poised to transfer 
power to the incoming Jeffersonian Republicans, the lame-duck 
Congress and President enacted legislation reducing the size of the 
Supreme Court from six members to five, and establishing sixteen new 
circuit judgeships (known as the “Midnight Judges Act”).70 The very 
next year, Jefferson and his Republican cohort in Congress returned the 
Supreme Court to six members, and disestablished the sixteen circuit 
judgeships, thereby removing their ostensibly life-tenured office-
holders.71 It was a brazen, partisan move that a meek Supreme Court 
upheld despite private grumbling among the justices that the legislation 
was patently unconstitutional.72 
For Senator William Giles, a cheerleader for the triumphant 
Jeffersonian Republicans, the theory of a separate and independent 
judiciary was “not critically correct,” even though it was “obvious 
that the framers of our Constitution proceeded upon this theory in its 
formation;” a truly independent judiciary, Giles reasoned, would be 
able “to execute the peculiar functions assigned to it without the aid, 
or in other words, independent of,” the other branches, which “is not 
 
68. Scott Douglas Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power: The Ori–
gins of an Independent Judiciary, 1606–1787, at 29–37 (2011). 
69. This inexperience was underscored after the constitutional convention, 
when Virginia enacted legislation establishing district courts and directing 
high court judges to staff them—legislation that the Virginia Court of 
Appeals invalidated as an unconstitutional encroachment on its judicial 
independence. At the Virginia ratification debate over the U.S. 
Constitution, Patrick Henry applauded his state court’s decision, but 
wondered aloud: “Are you sure that your federal judiciary will act thus? Is 
that judiciary as well constructed, and as independent of the other branches, 
as our state judiciary?” Patrick Henry, Statement at the Virginia 
Ratification Convention (June 12, 1788) in 3 The Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 313, 325 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1863). 
70. Jed Glickstein, Note, After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the Repeal of 
the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 Yale J.L. & Humans. 543, 543–44 (2012); 
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. 
71. Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 58, at 78–85. 
72. Id. at 82–83. 
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the Constitutional character of our Judicial department.”73 The separ–
ate and independent judiciary that the framers had been committed to 
establishing on paper was on the brink of obliteration in practice. 
B. Judicial Independence 2.0: Evolution 
The Midnight Judges Act and its repeal was a fork in the road for 
judicial independence. The path Giles had cleared envisioned a future 
without any meaningful autonomy for judges or the courts, in which 
Congress could and would control the judiciary by “remov[ing] . . . all 
its executive officers indiscriminately,” via impeachment and disestab–
lishment.74 That, however, would be the road not taken. 
Over the course of the next hundred and fifty years, a series of 
conventions would emerge, evolve, and entrench to guide Congress and 
the President. Such conventions would caution against initiatives that 
might threaten the independent judiciary so essential to the prevailing 
ROLP, which the framers aspired to protect in their Constitution. 
Making the case for the existence of constitutional conventions is tricky 
business under the best of circumstances, given their informality. It is 
especially difficult with judicial-independence conventions because the 
primary evidence of their existence is often the absence of action—the 
steps inimical to judicial independence that Congress or the President 
could have taken but did not. Sometimes, evidence of the reasons for 
political branch inaction takes the helpful form of statements offered 
by elected officials, which explicitly link inaction to respect for a given 
judicial-independence convention. In the absence of such statements, a 
judicial-independence convention can only be inferred from an 
uninterrupted course of conduct compatible with a convention that 
cannot readily be explained on other grounds. Making the case for 
conventions of the latter type is more problematic, insofar as supporting 
evidence is entirely circumstantial. Ironically, however, conventions 
that enjoy silent acquiescence may be more robust, to the extent that 
explicit statements in defense of a convention tend to be necessary only 
when the convention is vulnerable to attack. 
1. Congressional Conventions 
Convention Against Impeaching Judges for Their 
Decisions: Senator William Giles’ campaign against judges appointed 
by Federalist Presidents included an initiative to remove them via 
impeachment; and while he succeeded with Judge John Pickering, 
Pickering was more than a strident Federalist—he was an insane and 
 
73. 17 Annals of Cong. 114, 114–15 (1808) (statement of William Giles). 
74. Letter from William Giles to Thomas Jefferson (March 16, 1801), reprinted 
in Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles: A Study in the 
Politics of Virginia and the Nation from 1790 to 1830, at 77 (1914). 
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alcoholic strident Federalist.75 That made it easier to remove Pickering 
but at the expense of making it harder to cite his impeachment as 
precedent for removing judges who had fallen from political favor.76 The 
Jeffersonian-Republicans then impeached Supreme Court Justice 
Samuel Chase because of his partisan pronouncements from the bench, 
but failed to convict him in the Senate, where the implications for 
judicial independence of removing a judge who issued problematic 
rulings was not lost on the prevailing Senate faction.77 In the years since 
Chase was acquitted, alleged abuse of judicial decision-making power 
has been among the charges featured in petitions for the impeachment 
of over thirty federal judges, precisely none of whom was removed on 
that basis.78 By 1986, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Courts declined to investigate such matters, reporting 
categorically that “impeachment does not apply to judicial decision-
making” because “[i]t would be a great irony if the protections found in 
the Judiciary’s constitutional charter—Article III—did not shield 
judges in their decisionmaking role.”79 
Convention Against Removing Judges Via Disestablish–
ment of Courts: Giles successfully exploited Congress’s power to 
establish inferior courts as authority to disestablish an entire tier of 
federal courts and remove their officeholders. The Midnight Judges Act 
and its repeal would indeed set a precedent for the future, but not the 
one Giles had in mind, for it became a precedent to avoid rather than 
follow. Over the course of the nineteenth century, as Congress enlarged 
the judicial workforce to accommodate westward expansion, it became 
increasingly solicitous of the judiciary’s institutional independence and 
reliably suspicious of proposals to revamp lower court structure, which 
were repeatedly rejected with negative reference to the ham-handed 
Midnight Judges Act and its repeal.80 The convention against this form 
of court packing and unpacking became so entrenched that never again 
 
75. Emily Field Van Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: 
A Documentary History from 1787 to Present 91 (1999). 
76. Id. at 92. 
77. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 131–42. 
78. The analysis is complicated by the fact that judges targeted for impeachment 
are often subject to multiple charges, including but not limited to abuse of 
judicial power. Some judges were impeached and acquitted; some were 
impeached and resigned; and some were investigated and resigned. But none 
after Pickering were impeached and removed for highhanded decision-
making. Id. at 120–24 tbl.1. 
79. Findings and Conclusions of Robert W. Kastenmeier on Citizen Petitions 
to Impeach Three Federal Judges (Sept. 25, 1986) (on file with the author). 
80. Id. at 61–65. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021 
Judicial Independence at Twilight 
1068 
would Congress disestablish courts as a means to remove Article III 
judges from office.81 
Convention Against Partisan Manipulation of Supreme 
Court Size: Congress’s practice of retaining the basic structure of the 
federal courts established by the Judiciary Act of 1789—a practice 
expressly followed throughout most of the nineteenth century out of 
respect for the judiciary’s status as a separate and independent branch 
of government—can fairly be described as a convention in its own 
right. 82  In 1891, that convention yielded (though not without a 
protracted fight) to caseload pressures, when Congress established a 
new system of circuit courts of appeals.83 But longstanding respect for 
the structure of the 1789 Act birthed a related convention against 
partisan manipulation of Supreme Court size. The 1789 Act established 
a system of circuits and district courts below the Supreme Court, with 
each Supreme Court justice assigned to oversee (and ride) one of the 
enumerated circuits.84 With the exception of the notorious Midnight 
Judges Act of 1801, repealed the next year, in which the outgoing 
Federalist Congress sought to deprive incoming President Jefferson of 
an appointment by reducing the size of the Supreme Court from six 
justices to five, the size of the Supreme Court expanded in lockstep 
with the establishments of new circuits in the western states until 1866, 
when Congress shrank the Supreme Court from ten justices to seven.85 
One possibility is that Reconstruction era Republicans unpacked 
the Court to deny Democratic President Andrew Johnson multiple 
 
81. In 1913, Congress disestablished the short-lived Commerce Court which, in 
the minds of the majority who voted for its obliteration, had been corrupted 
by commercial interests as evidenced by the impeachment and removal of 
Commerce Court Judge Robert Archbald the previous year. Despite 
profound antipathy toward the Commerce Court and significant support 
for removing its judges, Congress preserved the judges’ offices when it 
disestablished the court, with the repeal of the Midnight Judges Act serving 
as a negative precedent. Id. at 81–85. 
82. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. See generally When Courts & 
Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 51–111 (discussing Congress’s 
century-long reluctance to disrupt the structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
out of deference to the negative precedent set by the Midnight Judges Act 
and its repeal). 
83. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See generally Felix 
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme 
Court (1928). 
84. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
85. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 68. For a 
discussion of the Midnight Judges Act and its repeal, see Center for the 
Study of the American Constitution, Midnight Appointments in Judiciary 
Politics, October 23, 2020, https://csac.history.wisc.edu/2020/10/23/mid 
night-appointments-in-judiciary-politics/ [https://perma.cc/8SJB-848S]. 
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appointments.86 This, however, is a dubious extrapolation from the 
available evidence. First, President Johnson signed the bill, which he 
would be unlikely to do if the measure was a partisan gambit to 
diminish his power.87 Second, there is a more prosaic explanation for 
the bill: Chief Justice Salmon Chase had proposed that Congress shrink 
the size of the Court to accommodate a salary increase for the remaining 
justices. 88  Third, the bill passed with virtually no debate or 
explanation—hardly the mark of a contentious power grab by one party 
to deprive the other of prized appointments. 89  Fourth, a contem–
poraneous account observed that “[t]here seems to have been no serious 
opposition to the law, which was in no sense a political measure, 
however much political feelings may have aided its passage.”90 Three 
years later, Congress increased the Court from seven to nine justices as 
part of an omnibus court reform package,91 which restored traditional 
correspondence between the number of circuits and justices, and the 
Court has remained at nine in the years since. Some argue that the 
failure of Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan established a 
new convention against further changes to Court size,92 but it also 
represented the application of a much more deeply rooted convention 
against manipulating Supreme Court size for openly partisan purposes. 
Qualified Conventions Against Constraining Judicial 
Independence Via Congressional Manipulation of Judicial 
Budgets, Salaries, and Workforce: Congress is not above playing 
games with the judiciary’s budgets, salaries, and judgeships. Congress 
is more generous with its appropriations to the judiciary when its 
partisan orientation and that of the courts are aligned.93 In the hopes 
 
86. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 83, at 72. 
87. Stanley I. Kutler, Reconstruction and the Supreme Court: The Numbers 
Game Reconsidered, 32 J.S. Hist. 42, 43 (1966). 
88. 6 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-88 (pt. I) 167–68 
(1971). 
89. Id. at 169. 
90. 1 American Law Review 1866–1867, at 206 (Boston, Little, Brown, 
and Co. 1867). The possibility that this contemporaneous account was a 
work of revisionism written by a bill supporter intent on concealing its 
partisan motivations is belied by the author’s criticism of the measure on 
the merits. Id. at 207. 
91. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch.22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44. 
92. Chafetz & Pozen, supra note 57, at 1440. 
93. Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the 
Supreme Court: The Role of the Chief Justice, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 
433, 442 (1996) (“The larger the difference between the Court [ideological] 
output rating and the preferred output of Congress . . . the smaller the 
budget.”). 
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of improving the prospects for giving itself a raise, Congress has linked 
increases in judicial salaries to increases in its own salaries—a failed 
gambit that has left judicial salaries to stagnate.94 In a related episode, 
federal judges took Congress to court and prevailed in 2014, after 
Congress withheld cost-of-living adjustments to federal judges that it 
had previously authorized.95 Bills creating new judgeships are likelier to 
pass when the same political party controls Congress and the White 
House,96 and such bills often include unnecessary judgeships in states of 
influential legislators, which can best be explained as a perk of power.97 
Such shenanigans notwithstanding, Congress has never exploited 
these powers to subjugate the judiciary. It has never slashed the 
judiciary’s operating budget in retaliation for unpopular judicial 
decisions, as many state legislatures have.98 Congress has not wielded 
its power to grant or withhold salary increases to punish or reward 
judges for their decision-making, and when congressional outliers 
propose to manipulate judicial salaries or budgets in these ways, the 
ensuing rebukes and inaction illuminate an underlying convention 
against such practices.99 In 1801, the Midnight Judges Act expanded 
the judicial workforce for arguably partisan purposes,100 but in the 
modern era, proposed new judgeships are supported by nonpartisan 
workload data supplied by the Judicial Conference,101 which has the 
 
94. See Russell R. Wheeler & Michael S. Greve, How to Pay the Piper: It’s 
Time to Call Different Tunes for Congressional and Judicial Salaries, 
Issues in Governance Stud. (Special Edition), April 2007, at 1, 1. 
95. James Rowley, Federal Judges in Cost-of-Living Suit Collect a 14 Percent 




96. John M. De Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the 
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal 
Judiciary, 39 J.L. & Econ. 435, 460 (1996). 
97. Ann Pelham, Biden Takes Judiciary to Task, Legal Times, July 2, 1990, 
at 7.  
98. American Bar Association, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the 
American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century 
Judiciary 40–43 (2003).  
99. Representative Steve King on Federal Budget Issues, C-SPAN (Mar. 16, 
2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?298525-5/representative-steve-king 
-federal-budget-issues [https://perma.cc/D5JE-TK2Z]. 
100. Landmark Legislation: Judiciary Act of 1801, Fed. Jud. Cent., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-legislation-judiciary-
act-1801 [https://perma.cc/2NHK-G7KM] (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
101. See Barry J. McMillion, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45899, Recent 
Recommendations by the Judicial Conference for New U.S. 
Circuit and District Court Judgeships: Overview and Analysis 
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effect of exposing unnecessary judgeships as highly visible exceptions to 
a convention against such manipulations.102 
Procedural Conventions in Judicial Confirmation 
Proceedings: The grounds upon which federal judges are nominated 
and then confirmed or rejected have always been openly partisan and 
unconstrained by conventions against intruding upon the prospective 
independence of nominees.103 The President and Senate did, however, 
adopt procedural conventions (some memorialized as Senate rules) that 
fostered deliberation, compromise, and consensus in the confirmation 
process, which promoted an independent judiciary indirectly. The 
tradition of “senatorial courtesy,” which began in the 1830s, called upon 
Presidents to confer with same-party Senators from a prospective 
district court nominee’s home state, and defer to the Senators’ 
recommendations. 104  The so-called “blue-slip” procedure enabled a 
nominee’s home-state senator to block a vote on the confirmation—a 
process that in practice added a layer of consultation and cooperation 
before a nomination could proceed.105 Cloture rules empowered as few 
as forty-one Senators to kill a confirmation by means of a filibuster, 
which incentivized Presidents to nominate judges who enjoyed  
10–11 (2019) (describing the process that the Judicial Conference 
Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics employs to assess judgeship needs with 
reference to workload factors). See also Deborah J. Barrow, Gerard S. 
Gryski & Gary Zuk, The Federal Judiciary and Institutional 
Change 93–94 (1996) (describing the “expertise” relevant to the Judicial 
Conference’s role as “initiator” of judgeships legislation in the modern era). 
The judiciary can manipulate the workload data to serve its own 
institutional interests, but that is a separate concern that does not implicate 
Congressional encroachment on the judiciary’s independence. See, e.g., 
Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the 
Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences 
Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 37–38 
(2012) (discussing the factors considered by judges taking ‘senior status,’ 
such as creating a vacancy). 
102. Id. 
103. See generally Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and 
Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments 
from Washington to Bush II (5th ed. 2008) (arguing that “political and 
ideological compatibility” between President, Senate and Justice has been 
demonstrably important in Supreme Court appointments). 
104. Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege, and Power: The Senate’s Role in 
the Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 Judicature 24, 26 (2002); See 
Jessie Kratz, The Origins of Senatorial Courtesy, National Archives: 
Pieces of History (Aug. 3, 2014), https://prologue.blogs.archives. 
gov/2014/08/03/the-origins-of-senatorial-courtesy/ [https://perma.cc/K 
MJ4-HW57]. 
105. Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the Norms of the 
Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 75, 76 
(2001). 
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bipartisan acquiescence, if not support. 106  Beginning in the 1950s, 
Presidents called upon the American Bar Association to review nominee 
qualifications, which facilitated broader consensus in support of the 
ABA’s nonpartisan recommendations and bolstered the credibility of 
nominees deemed qualified.107 In promoting deliberation, consensus, and 
compromise, these rules cultivated a stable selection process, which 
yielded a judicial workforce that (with exceptions) enjoyed broad-based 
support—a workforce that, in the public’s mind, could be trusted with 
its independence. 
2. Presidential Conventions 
Convention Against Openly Defying Court Orders: As a 
matter of constitutional principle, the President’s obligation to comply 
with direct orders of the U.S. Supreme Court, consonant with the 
principle of checks and balances, is all but universally accepted.108 It is 
just as universally understood, however, that the President possesses 
the raw political power to defy a direct order, and that the Supreme 
Court is helpless to force compliance if he does.109 But true defiance, 
when the President openly flouts a Supreme Court order directing him 
to take specified action, has occurred only once, when, in the midst of 
the Civil War, Lincoln activated the suspension clause and refused to 
 
106. See, e.g., Betsy Palmer, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31948, Evolution of 
the Senate’s Role in the Nomination and Confirmation Process: 
A Brief History 13–15 (2008) (discussing the first clear-cut example of 
successful filibuster against a judicial nomination). For an overview on 
Senate procedures on filibuster and cloture, see Valerie Heitshusen & 
Richard S. Beth, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30360, Filibusters and 
Cloture in the Senate (2017). 
107. Statement of ABA President Hilarie Bass Re: ABA Judicial Evaluations, 
American Bar Association (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar. 
org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/11/statement_of_abapre/ 
[https://perma.cc/V7SZ-K2Z7]. 
108. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1313–14 (1996) 
(“[E]very modern departmentalist scholar has maintained that the President 
has an obligation to enforce specific judgments rendered by federal courts, 
even when the President believes that the judgments rest on erroneous 
constitutional reasoning.”) (footnotes omitted). But see Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 283 (1994)(“There is no general power of courts 
to issue direct orders to the President that the President is constitutionally 
obliged to obey . . . .”). 
109. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to 
the President, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829, 832 (2018). For a general discussion 
of court orders and presidential defiance, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins 
(and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 488–93 
(2018). 
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comply with a writ of habeas corpus in the teeth of a Supreme Court 
order that he do so.110 
Explanations for why Presidents do not defy court orders share a 
common theme introduced in the opening paragraphs of this article: the 
Constitution works because we will it to work. The ROLP has created 
a powerful default in favor of Presidential compliance with Court 
orders. The reservoir of legitimacy that an independent judiciary enjoys 
renders defiance a perilous course for Presidents in all but the most 
extraordinary circumstances. 111  And the Supreme Court has acted 
strategically by issuing orders against Presidents infrequently and 
under circumstances in which the Court has an airtight rationale that 
deprives Presidents of plausible arguments for defiance.112 One scholar 
has described the resulting “obligation of governmental officials to obey 
judicial orders,” as possibly “the most important convention of all.”113 
With the crisis-breeding option of brazenly defying direct court orders 
rendered effectively nonviable, Presidents and courts have confined 
their skirmishes over compliance to matters of degree, and, on rare 
occasion, enforcement of Supreme Court orders issued against other 
parties.114 
Qualified Convention against Rhetoric that Delegitimizes 
the Courts: There are innumerable examples of Presidents taking 
exception to judges, courts and judicial decisions, with colorful criticism 
of judges and judicial decisions making occasional appearances in off-
the-record remarks. 115  Delegitimizing rhetoric, in contrast, which 
 
110. James A. Dueholm, Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: 
An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 29 J. Abraham Lincoln Ass’n 
47 (2008). See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
111. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the 
Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 487, 507 (2018). 
112. Id. at 507–08. See also Michael J. Gerhardt, Presidential Defiance and the 
Courts, 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 67, 71 (2018) (providing Nixon as an 
example of when a President thought better of defying a Supreme Court 
order). But see Epstein & Posner, supra note 109, at 832 (explaining 
presidential power in the Supreme Court).  
113. James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially 
Unenforceable Rules That Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public 
Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 645, 674 
& n.128 (1992). 
114. See, e.g., David Janovsky & Sarah Turberville, The President v. The 
Courts, POGO (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/ 
02/president-v-courts/ [https://perma.cc/P67Y-6UBX] (describing how 
President Nixon agreed to obey a “definitive” decision from the Supreme 
Court, suggesting that he would not have complied with something less, or 
with an order from a lower court). 
115. See Todd S. Purdum, Presidents, Picking Justices, Can Have Backfires, 
N.Y. Times (July 5, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/ 
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challenges the legitimacy of judges by attacking their integrity or 
accusing them of usurping power in derogation of their duty to uphold 
the law, is quite rare. Thomas Jefferson once characterized the federal 
courts as a “subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working 
under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated 
fabric”—but did so in private correspondence, after he had left office.116 
Andrew Jackson had his quarrels with the Marshall Court, but did not 
publicly challenge the Court’s legitimacy or impugn its integrit. 117 
Abraham Lincoln warned that “if the policy of the Government . . . is 
to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, . . . the 
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent 
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal”—but sandwiched that observation between statements 
emphasizing his support for the Court and respect for its rulings.118 
Richard Nixon observed that “[w]hen you look at what the United 




116. Jefferson on the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (June 23, 1861), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1861/06/23/archives/jefferson-on-the-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/LTX5-YNB9]. 
117. Jeffrey Rosen, Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in 
Attacking the Courts, The Atlantic (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-historical-precedent-for-trumps-at 
tack-on-judges/516144/ [https://perma.cc/M86Q-UNKW]. Jackson vetoed 
a bill re-chartering the National Bank because he deemed it uncons–
titutional, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court upheld the validity of 
the original charter, explaining that it was his duty to “decide upon the 
constitutionality of any bill,” independently of the Court. Id. Jackson may 
have questioned the limits of judicial supremacy, but he did not defy a 
Court order and cannot fairly be characterized as attacking the Court’s 
legitimacy or integrity. When, in response to a later Court ruling, Jackson 
reportedly said that “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him 
enforce it,” one might infer a more menacing threat to the Court’s authority 
and legitimacy—but the best available evidence is that Jackson never made 
the statement. See id. 
118. Mr. Lincoln and the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 1861), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1861/03/09/archives/mr-lincoln-and-the-suprem 
e-court.html [https://perma.cc/38V6-9HWR]. Immediately before making 
the quoted statement, Lincoln said that he did not “deny that [constitutional 
questions decided by the Supreme Court] must be binding in any case upon 
the parties . . . while they are also entitled to very high respect and consi–
deration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the Government.” 
Id. Immediately after the quoted statement, Lincoln added, “[n]or is there 
in this meant any assault upon the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from 
which they may not shrink to decide cases of property brought before them, 
and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political 
purposes.” 
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wonder if we truly have representative government anymore”—but he 
said that as a candidate, before he became President.119 
The convention against delegitimizing rhetoric, however, should be 
qualified by the anti-Court campaign of Franklin Roosevelt. FDR’s 
campaign was prompted by a series of Supreme Court decisions that 
invalidated legislation integral to FDR’s New Deal agenda—an agenda 
that sought to combat the Great Depression by expanding the role of 
the federal government in the economic recovery.120 FDR railed that the 
Court had usurped power, by “cast[ing] doubts on the ability of the 
elected Congress to protect us against catastrophe,” and again, by 
“improperly set[ting] itself up as a third house of the Congress . . . 
reading into the Constitution words and implications which are not 
there, and which were never intended to be there.”121 After the Court 
upheld a piece of New Deal legislation, he impugned the dissenters’ 
allegiance to the country and Constitution, accusing them of concluding 
that “the right under a private contract to exact a pound of flesh was 
more sacred than the main objectives of the Constitution to establish 
an enduring Nation.”122 As a consequence of these alleged usurpations, 
he argued that the Court could not be trusted, declaring that “we must 
take action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from 
itself.”123 Such statements are undeniably a break from the convention 
of restraint in Presidential criticism of the Court. It bears emphasis, 
however, that Roosevelt was a convention-breaker extraordinaire. He 
attacked the Court like no other, tried to pack the Court like no other, 
expanded the role of the federal government in American life like no 
other, and was the first and only President in history to defy the two-
term convention and seek a third term in office.124 Moreover, context is 
key to understanding FDR’s role as convention-breaker, which occurred 
amid the back-to-back, protracted national emergencies of the Great 
Depression and World War II. 125  Therefore, FDR may fairly be 
 
119. Chris Hickman, Courting the Right: Richard Nixon’s 1968 Campaign 
against the Warren Court, 36 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 287, 287 (2011). 
120. David E. Kyvig, The Road Not Taken: FDR, the Supreme Court, and 
Constitutional Amendment, 104 Pol. Sci. Q. 463, 464–65 (1989). 
121. Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (NBC radio broadcast 
Mar. 9, 1937). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Two Great Leaders, 57 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 465 
(2012); FDR’s Third-Term Election and the 22nd Amendment, Nat’l 
Const. Ctr.: Const. Daily (Nov. 5, 2020), https://constitutioncenter. 
org/blog/fdrs-third-term-decision-and-the-22nd-amendment [https://per 
ma.cc/V6BB-CK6M]. 
125. His abrogation of conventions against Court packing, delegitimizing 
rhetoric, and a limited national government arose out of his campaign to 
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characterized as sui generis—an outlier whose exceptional attacks upon 
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court highlight the prevalence of an 
underlying rule or convention against the practice that other Presidents 
have respected under all but the most exigent circumstances. 
The many and varied conventions summarized here proceeded from 
a common premise: that they were needed to constrain powers that the 
President and Congress might otherwise exploit to undermine judicial 
independence in ways antithetical to the ROLP that the framers sought 
to implement in their Constitution. This cluster of conventions 
comprises a broader custom of political branch respect for the judi–
ciary’s autonomy that I have previously denominated “customary 
independence.”126 Customary independence is not grounded in some 
naïvely optimistic belief that political branch actors stay their hand out 
of altruistic admiration for the judiciary’s freedom from encroachment. 
Rather, customary independence is a biproduct of the deep-seated 
legitimacy that the judiciary enjoys with the public that the political 
branches serve, which renders political-branch power grabs at the 
expense of the judiciary’s autonomy a perilous strategic ploy.127 
The emergence and entrenchment of customary independence 
bespeaks a form of judicial branch exceptionalism. There are myriad 
constitutional conventions that regulate how the executive and 
legislative branches conduct their own affairs and interact with each 
other. But conventions regulating relationships with the judiciary are 
different: they represent a conglomeration of related practices that fill 
a sizable hole in the constitutional design of a branch of government 
that the framers left gaping through inexperience and benign neglect. 
Without customary independence, the political branches could comply 
with the tenure and salary protections of Article III but still bring the 
judiciary to its knees by exploiting other powers at their disposal, in 
derogation of the ROLP that the framers sought to implement. In other 
words, constitutional conventions are instrumental to the efficient 
operation of the political branches in relation to the other branches, but 
 
combat the Great Depression, as discussed here, while his decision to run 
for a third term was attributable to the onset of World War II. Richard 
Moe, Why (and How) FDR Ran for His Third Term, Hist. News 
Network (Aug. 12, 2013), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/152895 
[https://perma.cc/U8V7-GHCB]. 
126. Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in Judicial 
Independence at the Crossroads 160, 162–63 (Stephen Burbank & 
Barry Friedman eds., 2002). 
127. For example, Professor William Ross explains the cool reception FDR’s 
Court-packing plan received in Congress, with reference to grassroots 
opposition to the President’s encroachment on the judiciary’s autonomy. 
William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and 
Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890–1937, at 1 (1994). 
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they are essential to the very survival of a separate and independent 
judiciary. 
C. Judicial Independence 3.0 
During Judicial Independence 2.0, independence norms gradually 
evolved into discrete conventions that collectively comprised customary 
independence. The road to customary independence was bumpy. 
Judicial-independence conventions often emerged between or during 
cycles of anti-court sentiment that challenged judicial-independence 
norms and sometimes threatened their survival.128 But over the course 
of the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries—the heyday of 
Judicial Independence 2.0—these cycles of court-directed hostility ac–
quired a distinct pattern. Each cycle began in the aftermath of a major 
transition of political power—following the ascent of the Jeffersonian 
Republicans in 1801; the Jacksonian Democrats in 1829; Reconstruction 
Republicans in 1865; Progressive Reformers in the 1890s; the New 
Dealers in 1933; Richard Nixon (whose election culminated a campaign 
against the Warren Court) in 1969; and congressional Republicans in 
1995. Leaders of each new regime, disgruntled by decisions of judges 
left behind by the former regime, would then propose to constrain the 
independence of the holdover judges. Court defenders, armed with 
judicial-independence conventions, would challenge and thwart court 
critics; holdover judges would act strategically to reduce unnecessary 
confrontations; judges appointed by the new regime would gradually 
replace holdover judges as they retired, and the cycle would wind 
down.129 
The longevity of customary independence is attributable to the 
ROLP, which guided both the formation of the Constitution itself, and 
the independence conventions that emerged to fill spaces in the 
constitutional text in a manner consistent with the paradigm. 
Beginning in the 1920s, however, a slowly gathering confluence of 
developments in social science, federal judicial appointments, state 
judicial elections, media coverage of courts, and public opinion, began 
to challenge assumptions core to the ROLP—most notably, the 
assumption that independent judges set extralegal influences aside and 
impartially uphold the law. 
 
128. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 51–52. 
129. Charles Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in The 
Politics of Judicial Independence 19, 21 (Bruce Peabody ed., Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press 2011). 
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1. Legal Realism and the Rise of Social Science 
The legal realism movement of the 1920s did not challenge the 
relevance of law to judicial decision-making, per se,130 but did challenge 
legal determinacy. Proponents of the new “realistic jurisprudence,” 
argued that empirical study was essential to understanding the choices 
judges made, because those choices could not be explained with 
reference to operative law alone.131 
Beginning in the early 1940s, dissenting and concurring opinions on 
the Supreme Court increased in frequency.132 That enabled an emerging 
cohort of political scientists to compare the ideological orientations of 
justices in the majority and dissent to the end of showing that the 
choices the justices made correlated with their preexisting ideological 
preferences. In the 1960s, Glendon Schubert dubbed this the 
“attitudinal model,” because it explained voting patterns on the 
Supreme Court with reference to the underlying attitudes of the 
justices.133 By the 1990s, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth declared the 
attitudinal model triumphant and the legal model “meaningless,”134 
while other political scientists relegated the relevance of law in Supreme 
Court decision-making to the status of myth.135 In the early 2000s, a 
team of law professors and political scientists showed that a computer 
model, which incorporated attitudinal factors into its analysis and took 
no account of the specific legal issues at stake, was better able to predict 
the outcomes of cases in a pending Supreme Court term than a panel 
of legal experts.136 In the years since, academic lawyers and political 
scientists have shifted focus to federal courts of appeal, where they have 
 
130. Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law 24–26 (2017). 
131. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 Colum. 
L. Rev. 431, 444 (1930). 
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 
Cornell L. Rev. 769, 771 (2015). 
133. Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and 
Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices 1946–1963, at 5–6 (1965); 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Glendon Schubert: The Judicial Mind, in The Pioneers 
of Judicial Behavior 78 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003). 
134. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, the Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model Revisited 66 (2002). 
135. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public 
Evaluation of the Supreme Court, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 928, 937–38 (2000). 
136. Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. 
Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science 
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1150 (2004). 
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found that attitudinal influences, while less pronounced than on the 
Supreme Court, are nonetheless measurable.137 
Back in the law schools, the Critical Legal Studies movement of the 
1970s planted seeds for later germination of critical race and critical 
feminist theories, which explored (among other things) the role that 
race and gender play in the administration of justice. 138  Studies 
correlating the race of the judge to rulings issued on motions to dismiss 
in race-discrimination cases underscored that political ideology is not 
the only extralegal influence on the decision-making of independent 
federal judges.139 
2. Judicial Appointments and the Ascendance of Ideology 
Meanwhile, the federal judicial appointments process was evolving 
on a parallel track. Supreme Court confirmation proceedings have never 
been apolitical. Throughout the nineteenth century, senators frequently 
offered makeweight, merits-based objections to Supreme Court 
nominees that concealed more deeply partisan motives aimed at pun–
ishing nominees for past political transgressions, thwarting unpopular 
Presidents, or backhanding Presidents for failing to consult with 
relevant Senate leaders before making nominations.140 It was not until 
1888, though, that the Senate first focused on the prospective impact 
of a nominee’s ideological orientation on his future decision-making as 
a basis for rejecting him—a focus that became increasingly prevalent 
throughout the twentieth century, culminating in the Senate’s 1986 
rejection of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork.141 In the years since 
the Bork rejection, nominee ideology has been a focus of virtually every 
Supreme Court confirmation proceeding, and has moved to the front 
and center of circuit and sometimes district court confirmation 
 
137. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical & Empirical Study 
of Rational Choice 82–85 (2013); see generally Cass R. Sunstein, 
David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are Judges 
Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006) 
(analyzing judicial behavior through statistics). 
138. See generally Cortney A. Franklin & Noelle E. Fearn, Gender, Race, and 
Formal Court Decision-Making Outcomes: Chivalry/Paternalism, Conflict 
Theory or Gender Conflict?, 36 J. Crim. Just. 279 (2008). 
139. See, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social 
Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 
Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 60–61 (2011). 
140. See When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 195–204. 
141. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal 
Judges, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 619 (2003); David J. Danelski, Ideology as 
a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork Nomination, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
900 (1990).  
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proceedings as well.142 Like the attitudinal model’s rejection of law as a 
meaningful influence on Supreme Court decision-making, the Senate’s 
partisan battle for ideological control of the courts cannot easily be 
squared with a tenet core to the ROLP: that when deciding cases, 
independent federal judges set aside their ideological predilections and 
other extralegal influences and uphold the law. 
As ideology became an increasingly pivotal issue in confirmation 
proceedings during Judicial Independence 3.0, senators from both 
political parties, keen to thwart the appointments of the opposing 
party’s President, began to abuse procedural conventions in the service 
of changing objectives. Scheduling hearings and floor votes on 
nominees, once an unexceptional convention to promote reasoned 
deliberation, was morphed into a weapon to stall and sometimes kill 
nominations.143 The blue-slip procedure, which had been employed to 
promote consultation between the President and a nominee’s home 
state Senator, was repurposed to block nominations outright. 144 
Filibusters, the threat of which had long served to encourage 
compromise and consensus, were exploited by the Senate minority to 
thwart nominees.145 
Another procedural convention, in place since 1953,146 granted the 
American Bar Association’s Committee on the Federal Judiciary early 
access to administration files on prospective nominees for the purpose 
of rating nominees’ qualifications on the basis of avowedly non-partisan 
criteria.147 After the Committee awarded President Reagan’s Supreme 
Court nominee Robert Bork a diminished (but favorable) rating in light 
of his ideology, conservatives began to accuse the ABA of having a 
liberal bias. 148  That suspicion was arguably corroborated by data 
showing that ABA ratings of Republican nominees were lower on 
 
142. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 204–08. 
143. Id. at 216–17. 
144. Id. at 217–18. 
145. Id. at 218–22. 
146. Stephanie Francis Ward, ABA Will Submit Judicial Rating for SCOTUS 
Nominee Neil Gorsuch, ABA J. (Feb. 21, 2017, 1:56 PM), https://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/aba_will_submit_judicial_rating_for_sco
tus_nominee [https://perma.cc/4D6J-BF7E]. 
147. See Lee Rawles, Its Ratings System Under Fire, ABA Stresses Importance 
of Federal Judicial Candidate Evaluations, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2018, 
1:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/federal_judicial 
_candidate_evaluations [https://perma.cc/VM5N-5HFF]. 
148. The ABA’s BFF: Why Obama Wants Lawyers to Rate Judges, Wall 
Street J. (Apr. 21, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1240271739 
65437107 [https://perma.cc/BSS4-GTYF]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021 
Judicial Independence at Twilight 
1081 
average than for Democratic nominees149 and culminated in President 
George W. Bush eliminating the ABA’s early access to nominee files.150 
The ABA’s post-nomination ratings, however, continued to be 
influential in the confirmation of Bush nominees, 151  and President 
Obama later restored the ABA’s traditional, pre-nomination role, never 
once nominating a judge that the ABA deemed “unqualified” (if only 
because he had the ratings in hand before making nominations).152 
3. The New Politics of Judicial Elections 
In a similar vein, beginning in the 1970s, a new politics of judicial 
elections morphed state supreme court races into well-funded 
campaigns to remove incumbents for making unacceptable decisions on 
such issues as tort reform, criminal justice, same-sex marriage, abortion, 
water rights, education funding, and other ideologically charged 
topics.153 These campaigns proceeded from the premise that indepen–
dent judges could not be trusted to uphold the law impartially and 
needed to be controlled at the ballot box. And the data show that the 
strategy works: judges dependent on voters respond to fear of defeat at 
 
149. Susan Navarro Smelcer, Amy Steigerwalt & Richard L. Vining, Jr., Bias 
and the Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees, 
65 Pol. Rsch. Q. 827, 836 (2012). This may demonstrate a liberal bias. 
Alternatively, Republican administrations have arguably demonstrated a 
more robust commitment to appointing ideologically compatible judges 
than their Democratic counterparts, which could translate into diminished 
emphasis on qualifications relative to ideology for Republican nominees. 
See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on 
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 
78 Ind. L.J. 363, 397 (2003) (discussing Reagan administration blueprint 
for reorienting constitutional law via the appointment of ideological 
conservatives to the Supreme Court). 
150. Ward, supra note 146. 
151. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/ 
politics/white-house-american-bar-association-judges.html [https://perma. 
cc/YQ66-WV4K]; George W. Bush, President, United States of America, 
Remarks at Hilton Cincinnati Netherland Plaza Discussing Judicial 
Accomplishments and Philosophy (Oct. 6, 2008), transcript available at 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/2008 
1006-5.html [https://perma.cc/C3VG-L9HK]; Ward, supra note 146. 
152. Patrick L. Gregory, Trump Picks More “Not Qualified” Judges (1), 
Bloomberg L. (Dec. 20, 2018, 2:11 AM), https://news.bloomberg 
law.com/us-law-week/trump-picks-more-not-qualified-judges-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/A6J5-BMKF]. 
153. Who is to Judge, supra note 59, at 60–61, 66. 
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the ballot box, ruling differently when elections are impending, by, for 
example, sentencing criminal defendants more harshly.154 
4. The Changing Media 
In a series of developments spanning more than a generation, the 
media became apostles for the gospel of an ideological judiciary. In 
divided decisions, the traditional media report on Supreme Court 
opinions with reference to the ideological voting blocs of justices in the 
majority and dissent.155 Cable television news networks emerged in the 
1980s and oriented their programming toward ideologically driven 
infotainment that attacked or defended Supreme Court decisions with 
reference to the pundit’s partisan inclinations.156 With the explosion of 
the internet in the 1990s, non-traditional citizen journalists, unencum–
bered by fact-checking norms that regulate the mainstream media, took 
to the internet and social media to attack judicial decisions they deemed 
ideologically unacceptable.157 
5. Public Perception 
Survey data show that the public shares the views animating 
Judicial Independence 3.0. Seventy-five percent of the public thinks 
that “a judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her personal political views 
to a great or moderate extent.”158 Fifty-eight percent agree with the  
154. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is 
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 247, 261 
(2004). 
155. Michael F. Salamone, Perceptions of a Polarized Court: How 
Division among Justices Shapes the Supreme Court’s Public Image 
30 (2018) (finding that Supreme Court decisions with more dissenting 
justices receive more media coverage and are likelier to be framed in 
ideological terms). 
156. See Tom Rosentiel, Partisanship and Cable News Audiences, Pew Rsch. 
Ctr. (Oct. 30, 2009), https://www.pewresearch.org/2009/10/30/parti 
sanship-and-cable-news-audiences/ [https://perma.cc/S25R-SF9W]. 
157. For instance, the Brennan Center for Justice issued “Court Pester Awards” 
on its website for several years, in response to the conservative Family 
Research Council’s “Court Jester Awards.” Ken Weine, Brennan Center 
Hands Out Court Pester Awards, Brennan Ctr. Just. (June 15, 1999), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/brennan-center-hands-out-
court-pester-awards [https://perma.cc/ESA8-6FGK]. 
158. Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr. of the U. of Pa., Fair and 
Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary 
3 (2006) [hereinafter Fair and Independent Courts], https://cdn.annen 
bergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/Releases/Release_Courts20060928
/Courts_Summary_20060928.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2X4-636W]. This 
data point is arguably in tension with a more recent Annenberg survey 
which found that 49% of respondents agreed with the statement that 
Supreme Court justices “set aside their personal and political views and 
make rulings based on the Constitution, the law, and the facts of the case.” 
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statement that “[j]udges always say that their decisions are based on 
the law and the Constitution, but in many cases judges are really basing 
their decisions on their own personal beliefs.”159 Fifty-seven percent 
think that the Supreme Court “gets too mixed up in politics.”160 The 
public regards elected judiciaries as more legitimate than appointed,161 
supports judges who promise to decide cases in a manner consistent 
with majority preferences,162 and is evenly divided on the question of 
whether the Supreme Court should be “less independent” to ensure that 
it “listens a lot more to what the people want.”163And while trust levels 
in the Supreme Court appear stable and strong (relative to support for 
Congress or the President) at 68%,164 that support is to no small extent 
contingent, “[w]hat have you done for me lately?” support.165 In other 
 
Most Americans Trust the Supreme Court, but Think it is Too “Mixed up 
in Politics”, Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr. of the U. of Pa. (Oct. 16, 
2019) [hereinafter Too “Mixed up in Politics”], https://www.annenberg 
publicpolicycenter.org/most-americans-trust-the-supreme-court-but-think-
it-is-too-mixed-up-in-politics/ [https://perma.cc/RS4A-5U4H]. While it is 
possible that the public thinks Supreme Court justices are less influenced 
by their political views than other judges, or that fewer people think judges 
are influenced by their political views in 2019 than 2006, the better 
explanation may lie with differences in how the questions were worded: 
whereas a substantial majority thinks that a judge “is influenced” by her 
political views, a lower percentage thinks that judges fail to “set aside” those 
views, with the latter phrase implying a more conscious choice. Fair and 
Independent Courts, supra, at 3; Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra. 
159. Law and Courts Questions from 2005 Poll, Campbell Pub. Affs. Inst., 
Syracuse U., https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/campbell/da 
ta_sources/Law%20and%20Courts%20Questions%20from%202005%20Poll
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBD5-NEMW] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021). 
160. Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra note 158. 
161. James L. Gibson, Electing Judges: The Surprising Effects of 
Campaigning on Judicial Legitimacy 107–08 (Benjamin I. Page, Susan 
Herbst, Lawrence R. Jacobs & James Druckman eds., 2012) (finding that 
judicial elections produce a net gain for legitimacy); see also Benjamin 
Woodson, The Two Opposing Effects of Judicial Elections on Legitimacy 
Perceptions, 17 State Pol. & Pol’y Q. 24, 36 (2017) (asserting that, in 
states with little election activity, the legitimacy of elected courts is higher 
than that of appointed courts). 
162. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of 
Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can Recusals Rescue the Legitimacy 
of Courts?, 74 J. Pol. 18, 31 (2012). 
163. Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra note 158. 
164. Id. 
165. Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and 
Interbranch Relations, 95 Geo. L. J. 909, 916 (2007) (“[T]here is reason to 
fear that the distinction between support for courts irrespective of the 
decisions they make (‘diffuse support’) and support depending on those 
decisions (‘specific support’) will disappear. If that were to occur, the people 
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words, relatively stable-seeming support for the Court is the equivalent 
of still water at the surface, concealing cross-currents that shift from 
administration to administration between liberal and conservative 
respondents, depending on the ideological orientation of the appointing 
President and the Supreme Court’s latest rulings.166 
These developments in social science, Senate confirmation 
proceedings, judicial elections, the media, and public opinion, are 
animated by common sentiments: that courts are battlefields for control 
of legal policy; that judges are ideological animals; that judicial 
independence cedes control of legal policy to the ideological preferences 
of judges; and that it is problematic to vest judges, rather than the 
people judges serve, with the power to control legal policy. In short, 
Judicial Independence 3.0 embodies a generations-long reassessment of 
the principles underlying the ROLP. 
The ultimate point is not that “we are all legal realists now,” as if 
the public has been jostled awake from its formalist slumber by the 
epiphany that judges do more (and less) than apply the law.167 To the 
contrary, the public has never been so naïve as to think that judges are 
impervious to extralegal influences. 168  That being so, longstanding 
support for the ROLP and its premise that independent judges set 
extralegal influences aside and impartially uphold the law, can best be 
explained in aspirational terms, as a worthy goal. Accordingly, the 
important point for purposes here is that during Judicial Independence 
3.0, public perception of empirical reality became so far removed from 
the assumptions undergirding the ROLP that the seeming hypocrisy of 
pretending that judges are something they are not began to wear thin. 
III. Judicial Independence 4.0: Collapse of Conventions 
Judicial Independence 3.0 embodied an emerging skepticism of the 
ROLP and its premise that independent judges hold their personal 
predilections at bay and impartially uphold the law. The pace of 
Judicial Independence 3.0 was glacial, spanning the better part of a 
century. If this third phase in the evolution of judicial independence 
progressed at a steady rate, one could anticipate that respect for the 
paradigm would continue to decline, resulting in the gradual 
disintegration of the discrete conventions that comprise customary 
independence, and culminating in the eventual collapse of the paradigm 
 
would ask of the judiciary not, ‘What does the law require?’ but rather, 
‘What have you done for me lately?’”). 
166. Id. at 915–16. See also Charles Gardner Geyh, The Supreme Court is Losing 
its Luster, New Republic (Mar. 11, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/ar 
ticle/131451/supreme-court-losing-luster [https://perma.cc/F7AV-TTFR]. 
167. See generally Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 
465 (1988). 
168. Geyh, supra note 44, at 61–69. 
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itself. But other sociopolitical changes, much broader than the 
judiciary, have converged to accelerate the assault on the ROLP and 
fracture customary independence, culminating in the repudiation of 
several judicial-independence conventions. Welcome to Judicial 
Independence 4.0. 
A. The Road to 4.0 
Four developments have contributed to the arrival of Judicial 
Independence 4.0: democracy fatigue; anti-elitism; the rise of neo-
populism; and political polarization. The relationship between these 
developments and the accelerated decline of customary independence is 
speculative, insofar as the causal linkage between such developments 
and diminishing support for the judiciary and its autonomy is indirect. 
But there is nothing speculative or indirect about the relationship 
between these developments and the ascent to power of neo-populist 
regimes in the United States and elsewhere. Nor is there anything 
speculative or indirect about the ways in which neo-populist regimes 
have consolidated power by weakening the judiciary’s check on 
executive branch authority, which, in the United States, has manifested 
in the repudiation of judicial-independence conventions. 
1. Democracy Fatigue 
In the United States, popular support for a democratic form of 
government remains robust. An overwhelming majority of Americans 
surveyed favor democracy over autocracy or military rule.169 There are, 
however, two chinks in the armor, manifested by a deepening distrust 
of the national government and deflated rates of voter participation. 
First, while support for democracy is strong in principle, support 
for the government that American democracy has wrought, is 
not. During the unpopular Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson withheld 
facts about the progress of the war effort that engendered public 
distrust of the national government. 170  That distrust deepened 
 
169. See Richard Wike, Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes & Janell Fetterolf, 
Democracy Widely Supported, Little Backing for Rule by Strong Leader or 
Military, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/ 
global/2017/10/16/democracy-widely-supported-little-backing-for-rule-by-
strong-leader-or-military/ [https://perma.cc/8LV7-YFTF]; Lee Drutman, 
Larry Diamond & Joe Goldman, Follow the Leader: Exploring American 
Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism, Democracy Fund Voter 
Study Grp. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publica 
tion/follow-the-leader [https://perma.cc/4XMF-YURE]. 
170. Public Trust in Government: 1958–2019, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-195 
8-2019/ [https://perma.cc/JZA8-CLVY]; Trust in Government, Gallup, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/3MKL-BV63] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). See also Karl Marlantes, 
Vietnam: The War That Killed Trust, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7, 2017), 
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precipitously in later decades, after the Watergate scandal during the 
Nixon administration, 171  the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan 
administration,172 and an unpopular war in Iraq during the George W. 
Bush administration.173 The net effect: the percentage of respondents 
who trust the federal government all or most of the time has declined 
from 77% at the beginning of the Johnson administration, to around 
17% today—with data suggesting that the trust levels will continue to 
decline even further.174 And among Republican voters, at least, distrust 
of the government has recently devolved into distrust of the electoral 
process, with only 33% of Republicans reporting that they trust U.S. 
elections in the aftermath of President Trump’s defeat in 2020.175  
Second, voter turnout in U.S. elections is low relative to other 
democracies,176 hovering at or near 60% in Presidential election years, 
and 40% in the midterms.177 Explanations vary, but three are germane  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/opinion/sunday/vietnam-the-war-
that-killed-trust.html [https://perma.cc/58N3-MK3E]; Julian E. Zelizer, 
How the Tet Offensive Undermined American Faith in Government, 
Atlantic (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2018/01/how-the-tet-offensive-undermined-american-faith-in-government/ 
550010/ [https://perma.cc/HP83-8U6J]. 
171. See Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170; Gallup, supra note 170. See also 
Ken Burns & Lynn Novick, How the Vietnam War Broke the American 
Presidency, Atlantic (Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/maga 
zine/archive/2017/10/how-americans-lost-faith-in-the-presidency/537897/ 
[https://perma.cc/4C67-XWZP]; Lynn Vavreck, The Long Decline of Trust 




172. Distrust of Reagan Shown in Poll, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at A15. 
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Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.people-press.org/2015/11/ 
23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/ [https://perma.cc/S43M-PQSS]. 
174. See Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170; Uri Friedman, Trust is Collapsing 
in America, Atlantic (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2018/01/trust-trump-america-world/550964/ [https: 
//perma.cc/B2G2-76RP]. 
175. Nick Laughlin & Peyton Shelbourne, How Voters’ Trust in Elections Shifted 
After Biden Victory, Morning Consult (Jan. 21, 2021) https://morning 
consult.com/form/tracking-voter-trust-in-elections/ [https://perma.cc/US8 
C-YU8G]. 
176. Drew Desilver, In Past Elections, U.S. Trailed Most Developed Countries 
in Voter Turnout, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.pew 
research.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/in-past-elections-u-s-trailed-most-devel 
oped-countries-in-voter-turnout/ [https://perma.cc/VQY6-FCVP]. 
177. See Michael P. McDonald, National General Election VEP Turnout Rates, 
1789–Present, U.S. Elections Project (citing Harold W. Stanley & 
Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics (3rd ed. 
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for purposes here: first, survey respondents report that they are too 
busy to vote,178 that they do not think voting is meaningful,179 and that 
they are insufficiently knowledgeable of the candidates to participate;180 
second, voters lose interest and participation drops off in less 
competitive races;181 and third, voter interest and participation decline 
as democracies age.182 Voter turnout in the 2020 presidential election 
was a record-breaking 67%, but the diminution in democracy fatigue 
this uptick in turnout might otherwise reflect was offset President 
Trump’s claim that the outcome was procured by fraud, which, as 
noted, undermined rather than enhanced public confidence in the 
democratic process among Republican voters.183 
 
1992)), http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present [https://perma. 
cc/866E-QS5B] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (discussing voter turnout rates 
up until 2018). 
178. See Asma Khalid, Don Gonyea & Leila Fadel, On the Sidelines of 
Democracy: Exploring why so Many Americans Don’t Vote, NPR (Sept. 
10, 2018, 5:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/645223716/on-the-
sidelines-of-democracy-exploring-why-so-many-americans-dont-vote [https: 
//perma.cc/5WYV-UGLW]; Gustavo López & Antonio Flores, Dislike of 
Candidates or Campaign Issues was Most Common Reason for not Voting 
in 2016, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (June 1, 2017), https://www.pewresear 
ch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/01/dislike-of-candidates-or-campaign-issues-was-
most-common-reason-for-not-voting-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/JN6Y-7L4 
W]; Michael D. Regan, Why is Voter Turnout So Low in the U.S.?, PBS 
(Nov. 6, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/voter-
turnout-united-states [https://perma.cc/MZS9-RMUB]. 
179. See Khalid et al., supra note 178; see López & Flores, supra note 178. 
180. See Khalid et al., supra note 178. 
181. Michael D. Martinez, Why is American Turnout so Low?, in The Oxford 
Handbook of American Elections & Political Behavior 107, 109 
(Jan E. Leighley ed., 2010). 
182. See Regan, supra note 178; see generally Filip Kostelka, Does Democratic 
Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Turnout? Global Evidence Since 
1939, 111 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 653 (2017); Anthony George Fowler, Five 
Studies on the Causes and Consequences of Voter Turnout (Mar. 2013) 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HU 
L.InstRepos:11156810. 
183. Jacob Fabina, Despite Pandemic Challenges, 2020 Election Had Largest 
Increase in Voting Between Presidential Elections on Record, U.S. Census 
Bureau, (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/ 
04/record-high-turnout-in-2020-general-election.html [https://perma.cc/D 
EN6-LTAU]; Laughlin & Shelbourne, supra note 175. 
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Relative to Congress 184  and the President, 185  the U.S. Supreme 
Court enjoys stronger public support, but the Court has not been 
immune to waning trust in the national government, as public 
confidence in the Court dipped below 50% from 2011 to 2018.186 Public 
support for the Supreme Court rallied in 2019, but that was best 
explained by an uptick in contingent support from conservative 
respondents in the wake of President Trump’s appointments of Justices 
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.187 And to the extent that growing distrust of 
American government is attributable in part to escalating anti-elitism, 
considered next, the implications for an expert, unelected, life-tenured 
judiciary are clear. 
2. Anti-Elitism 
Diminished confidence in the American government subsumes 
growing distrust of the elites at the helm of that government. Anti-
elitism is baked into America’s DNA, beginning with the Revolution 
itself—a rebellion of the people against the archetypal elite, King 
George III. 188  Waves of anti-elitism have come and gone in the 
generations since,189 resurfacing aggressively in the aftermath of the 
2008 recession—a recession which, in the minds of many, cast a spot–
light on the roles of wealthy elites in causing the financial crisis, and of 
government elites in bailing out the well-to-do with insufficient heed to 
 
184. See Congress and the Public, Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600 
/Congress-Public.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q4Q9-GNYB] (last visited Mar. 
11, 2021) (assessing public approval of Congress). 
185. See Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, 
Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/Presidential-approval-rati 
ngs-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx [https://perma.cc/94H8-DYYN] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2021); Pew Rsch. Ctr., supra note 170 (demon–
strating an overall decline in trust in the President).  
186. Supreme Court, Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-
court.aspx [https://perma.cc/KL3H-LWY2] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
187. See Too “Mixed up in Politics”, supra note 158; Robert Barnes, Polls Show 
Trust in Supreme Court, but There is Growing Interest in Fixed Terms and 





188. Beverly Gage, How “Elites” Became One of the Nastiest Epithets in 
American Politics, N.Y. Times (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/01/03/magazine/how-elites-became-one-of-the-nastiest-epithets-in-
american-politics.html [https://perma.cc/CKB4-7CJU] (“The notion that 
distant elites might be conspiring against the people comes straight from 
the Founding Fathers . . . .”). 
189. Id. 
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the plight of the middle class.190 This latest iteration of anti-elitism has 
targeted a range of actors including the wealthy (denominated the “top 
one percent”), 191  professionals, 192  intellectuals, 193  and experts, 194 
including scientists, the media, and career government officials.”195 
Judges are, in many ways, consummate elites: a specialized corps 
of legal experts, comprised of professionals with post-graduate degrees 
who sit aloft on benches, judging the masses. This rise of anti-elitism is 
to no small extent responsible for ending the mid-twentieth century 
movement toward “merit selection” systems for choosing state judges, 
the appeal of which was premised on the notion that expert 
commissions are better equipped to assess the specialized credentials 
and qualifications of expert judges, than average voters.196 Because 
 
190. Eric Merkley, Anti-Intellectualism, Populism, and Motivated Resistance to 
Expert Consensus, 84 Pub. Op. Q. 24, 27 (2020); Matt Taibbi, Secrets and 
Lies of the Bailout, Rolling Stone (Jan. 4, 2013 9:25 PM), https://www. 
rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/secrets-and-lies-of-the-bailout-1132 
70/ [https://perma.cc/2KWE-Y5F4]. 
191. Lisa A. Keister, The One Percent, 40 Ann. Rev. Sociology 347, 348 
(2014). 
192. Merkley, supra note 190, at 30. 
193. Matt Motta, “Had Enough of Experts?” Anti-intellectualism is Linked to 
Voters’ Support for Movements that are Skeptical of Expertise, London 
sch. Econ. U.S. Ctr. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ 
2017/08/30/had-enough-of-experts-anti-intellectualism-is-linked-to-voters-
support-for-movements-that-are-skeptical-of-expertise/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EQ6A-7YL9] (“[S]ince the mid-1990s, anti-intellectualism has been on the 
rise in the American public, especially amongst self-identified ideological 
conservatives . . . .”). 
194. Id. (“The electoral successes of Donald Trump and Brexit share something 
important in common. Both attempted to appeal to voters’ distrust of 
expertise in rallying support for their causes.”). 
195. Conor Lynch, Donald Trump’s Glorious Victory for Anti-Intellectualism: 
“Drain the Swamp” Just Meant the Eggheads, salon (Jan. 7, 2017, 
4:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/01/07/donald-trumps-glorious-
victory-for-anti-intellectualism-drain-the-swamp-just-meant-the-eggheads/ 
[https://perma.cc/NYQ2-68FM] (“For many of the millions who voted for 
Trump, the “swamp” in Washington . . . denote[s] . . . arrogant tech–
nocrats, bookish intellectuals and politically correct liberal elites who are 
indifferent to the struggles of the ‘forgotten men and women’ in middle 
America.”); Cathleen Decker, Analysis: Trump’s War Against Elites and 
Expertise, L.A. Times (July 27, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes. 
com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-elites-20170725-story.html [https://perma.cc 
/J82D-WRXS] (“[F]or Trump and his allies, a war on elites has been central 
to the campaign which put him in the presidency . . . . Among his targets 
so far: the government’s intelligence agencies, the media, foreign allies, the 
Department of Justice, establishment politicians, scientists and the 
Congressional Budget Office.”). 
196. Who is to Judge?, supra note 59, at 93–95. 
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unelected federal judges derive legitimacy from their perceived legal 
expertise, they are uniquely vulnerable to anti-elitism campaigns. As 
Suzanna Sherry observes, “many people no longer see judges as 
possessing legal expertise” because of attacks by “politicians, pundits, 
and legal academics,” who “explicitly accus[e] the Justices of twisting 
the law to serve their . . . political goals.”197 
3. The Rise of Neo-populism 
When a broad swath of the public becomes disillusioned with its 
democracy, and distrustful of its government and the elites responsible 
for making public policy, it affords an opportunity for a strong, self-
proclaimed man or woman of the people to rise up and establish a more 
populist form of leadership.198 The recent resurgence of populism is a 
world-wide phenomenon: President Trump was among more than forty-
five populist-style leaders who have risen to power since the 1990s.199 
Features common to the neo-populist leader include: striving to 
dismantle the political establishment; pitting those comprising the neo-
populist’s base against others in the society, differentiated along lines 
of wealth, religion, race, ethnicity, or status; claiming to represent the 
silent majority; blaming failures on sabotage by elites; and using simple, 
direct, and sometimes boorish-seeming behavior to establish themselves 
as one of the “real” people.200 
Voter distrust of experts and disaffection for government as usual 
correlate with a desire for a stronger, more autocratic leader, who can 
wrest control from elites and reclaim government in the people’s 
name.201 Once elected, neo-populist leaders have consolidated power by 
 
197. Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline 
of Expertise, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 11 (2011) (emphasis in original). 
198. André Munro, Populism, Encyc. Britannica, https://www.britannica. 
com/topic/populism [https://perma.cc/5FL9-N5FM] (last visited Feb. 23, 
2021) (defining populism as a “political program or movement that cham–
pions, or claims to champion, the common person, usually by favourable 
contrast with a real or perceived elite or establishment.”). 
199. Yascha Mounk & Jordan Kyle, What Populists Do to Democracies, 
Atlantic (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/ 
2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ [https://perma. 
cc/GR2J-J8BH]. 
200. See Robert R. Barr, The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From 
Fujimore to Toledo, 24 Third World Q. 1161, 1162 (2003); see generally 
Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very 
Short Introduction 7–8 (2017). 
201. See Lee Drutman, Larry Diamond & Joe Goldman, Follow the Leader: 
Exploring American Support for Democracy and Authoritarianism, Voter 
Study Grp. (Mar. 2018), https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/ 
follow-the-leader [https://perma.cc/2C33-86LT] (correlating disaffection 
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weakening institutional checks on their authority, via (among other 
strategies) stifling dissent within their own political parties, discrediting 
the media, and—of particular importance here—weakening the 
judiciary.202 
Neo-populist regimes have weakened their respective judiciaries in 
different ways. Turkey, and later Hungary, employed a two-stage 
gambit: first, they expanded the jurisdiction of their high courts, which 
overwhelmed court dockets; second, to address the caseload crisis 
thereby created, they packed their courts with additional jurists 
sympathetic to the new regime.203 Hungary took an additional approach 
by lowering the mandatory retirement age for judges, thereby removing 
a significant number of experienced judges in leadership roles. The new 
regime replaced those judges with jurists more to its liking after 
discrediting the outgoing judges as products of the Communist era.204 
Poland and Egypt later adopted a similar tactic.205 
4. Political Polarization 
Neo-populism is divisive by design. It seeks to position the populist 
leader and his insular base of ordinary folk against elites, immigrants, 
the media, and anyone else who challenges the populist leader or his 
agenda. To that extent neo-populism exploits and exacerbates a 
polarized electorate. And in the United States, the electorate has 
become increasingly polarized over the course of the past generation. 
Studies show that political leaders in the United States have 
recently become more polarized along ideological lines (in relation to 
their diverging positions on policy issues) and affective lines (in relation 
to their growing dislike for members of the opposing political party).206 
With respect to the general public, the evidence does not support the 
conclusion that average Americans have become demonstrably more 
 
with government and distrust of experts with support for more autocratic 
leadership). 
202. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 545, 547–48 
(2018). 
203. Id. at 551.  
204. Id. at 549–50, 553. 
205. Id. at 552–54. 
206. Nolan McCarty, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and 
Unequal Riches 16–70 (2006); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, 
Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 563, 
565 (2008); Robert M. Faris, Hal Roberts, Bruce Etling, Nikki 
Bourassa, Ethan Zuckerman & Yochai Benkler, Partisanship, 
Propaganda & Disinformation: Online Media & the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election 41 (2017); Yphtach Lelkes, Mass Polarization: 
Manifestations and Measurements, 80 Pub. Op. Q. 392, 393 (2016). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021 
Judicial Independence at Twilight 
1092 
polarized in ideological terms.207 Rather, the data show that the range 
of public opinion on public policy questions has remained relatively 
stable over time. 208  There is, however, substantial support for the 
proposition that the public has become more affectively polarized. The 
percentage of Republicans who view Democrats unfavorably rose from 
74% in 1994 to 91% in 2016, while the percentage of Democrats who 
view Republicans unfavorably increased from 59% to 86% over the same 
time frame.209 The dramatic uptick in political polarization during the 
latter years of Judicial Independence 3.0 has obvious and immediate 
implications for the future of judicial independence in the ROLP. 
Insofar as rising antipathy for the opposing political party extends to 
judges appointed by the opposing political party, conversations about 
the role ideology plays in judicial decision-making morph into darker 
suspicions about the influence of naked partisan politics. And if, in a 
highly polarized world, judges are perceived as partisan appendages of 
the President who appointed them, longstanding conventions aimed at 
preserving the independence of such judges lose their reason for being.210 
B. The Arrival of 4.0: Convention Collapse 
Democracy fatigue, anti-elitism, and political polarization 
engendered public support for a neo-populist leader in the mold of 
Donald Trump.211 And consolidating executive power by weakening the 
 
207. Morris P. Fiorina, Unstable Majorities: Polarization, Party 
Sorting, and Political Stalemate 23–27 (2017). 
208. Id. at 29 (“All in all, the data compiled by academic and commercial survey 
organizations indicate that in broad outline the American public has 
changed little in the past four decades. In the aggregate, the public today 
looks much the same as the one that chose between Gerald Ford and Jimmy 
Carter in 1976, well before the polarization era.”). 
209. Faris et al., supra note 206, at 41. 
210. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Curbing the 
Court: Why The Public Constrains Judicial Independence 6 (2020) 
(“Thus, for both the left and the right, actions that threaten the Court’s 
power have become fair game. . . . [O]ur book’s theory and empirical 
findings—focusing on when and why the public supports such attacks on 
the Court—have important implications for the extent of the Court’s 
legitimacy and ultimately its independence and power in the political 
system.”). 
211. See Joshua J. Dyck, Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz & Michael 
Coates, Primary Distrust: Political Distrust and Support for the Insurgent 
Candidacies of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Primary, 
51 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 351, 352–355 (2018) (attributing success of populist 
candidates to government distrust); Melissa De Witte, The Great 
Recession Has Influenced Populist Movements Today, say Stanford 
Scholars, Stan. News (Dec. 26, 2018), https://news.stanford.edu/2018/ 
12/26/explaining-surge-populist-politics-movements-today/ [https://perma 
.cc/TBR7-F7Y4] (crediting anti-elitism for success of Trump’s populist 
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judiciary’s capacity to keep such power in check is an essential 
component of the neo-populist playbook.212 With support for judicial 
independence in an already weakened state during Judicial 
Independence 3.0, President Trump, aided by a compliant Republican 
Senate (whose compliance President Trump secured by consolidating 
power within his own party—another common, neo-populist strategy213) 
heralded the arrival of Judicial Independence 4.0 by abrogating judicial 
independence and related conventions with unprecedented zeal. For 
their part, Democratic presidential candidates and congress-members 
have proposed to fight fire, which all but assures that disruption of 
longstanding conventions will persist into the foreseeable future.214 
1. Dismantling Procedural Conventions in Confirmation Proceedings 
Longstanding procedural conventions in judicial confirmation pro–
ceedings have collapsed. Time-honored rules and practices, weakened 
from misuse and marginalization during Judicial Independence 3.0, 
shattered with the arrival of 4.0. 
In 2016, the Republican Senate majority took the extraordinary 
step of announcing that it would exploit its control of the calendar to 
deny President Obama’s Supreme Court nominee, Judge Merrick 
Garland, a hearing or vote, 310 days before the President left office.215 
The Senate leadership made clear that it was holding the vacancy open 
for then-candidate Donald Trump to fill should he win the election, 
while one Senate Republican leader added that he would block all 
 
appeal); Dalibor Rohac, Liz Kennedy & Vikram Singh, Drivers of 
Authoritarian Populism in the United States, Ctr. for Am. Progress 
(May 10, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/ 
reports/2018/05/10/450552/drivers-authoritarian-populism-united-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/42UT-JH66] (linking polarization to success of Trump’s 
populist appeal). 
212. See Scheppele, supra note 202, at 553; see also Michael Hoffman, [PiS]sing 
off the Courts: The PiS Party’s Effect on Judicial Independence in Poland, 
51 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1153, 1161–64 (2018) (discussing tactics to 
weaken judicial independence as feature of Populist regime in Poland). 
213. Perry Bacon Jr., Trump Completed His Takeover of the GOP in 2019, 
FiveThirtyEight (Dec. 23, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/ 
features/trump-completed-his-takeover-of-the-gop-in-2019/ [https://perma 
.cc/HV7Y-XCWZ]. 
214. See Elaine Godfrey, The Democrats’ Supreme Court Hail Mary, Atlantic 
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/ 
democrats-case-court-packing/616446/ [https://perma.cc/R88Z-D7HA]. 
215. Eric Bradner, Here’s What Happened When Senate Republicans Refused to 
Vote on Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court Nomination, CNN (Sept. 19, 
2020, 8:16 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/merrick-garlan 
d-senate-republicans-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/2F8C-H5TL]. 
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Supreme Court nominations for the next four years if Democratic 
Presidential nominee Hillary Clinton was elected.216 
In characterizing the Garland gambit as extraordinary, I do not 
mean to suggest that there is no precedent for the Senate declining to 
act on pending Supreme Court nominations, thereby leaving the vacan–
cy for the President’s successor to fill. In 1829, the Senate voted to 
postpone action on President John Quincy Adams’ nomination of John 
Crittendon to the Supreme Court, whom Adams had nominated in the 
final weeks of his term after he had lost his bid for reelection.217 In 1845, 
the wildly unpopular President John Tyler, who became President after 
the death of William Henry Harrison, nominated John Read to the 
Supreme Court 25 days before Tyler left office—a nomination that the 
Senate allowed to lapse.218 In 1852 and 1853, three Supreme Court 
nominees (Edward Bradford, George Badger, and William Micou) of 
the likewise unpopular President Millard Fillmore, who succeeded 
Zachary Taylor upon his death, were withdrawn or allowed to lapse 
200, 60, and 18 days, respectively, before the end of Fillmore’s term.219 
And in 1866, after Democratic President Andrew Johnson became 
President following the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, the 
Republican Congress reduced the size of the Supreme Court from ten 
to seven, killing the pending Supreme Court nomination of Henry 
 
216. Nina Totenberg, Sen. McCain Says Republicans Will Block All Court 
Nominations If Clinton Wins, NPR (Oct. 17, 2016, 9:44 PM) 
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/17/498328520/sen-mccain-says-republican 
s-will-block-all-court-nominations-if-clinton-wins [https://perma.cc/2KV 
3-KCQ7] (“‘I promise you that we will be united against any Supreme 
Court nominee that Hillary Clinton, if she were president, would put up,’ 
[Senator McCain] declared.”).  
217. Mark Lawrence, Supreme Court Nominees Rejected by the Senate, Wash. 
Post (Sept. 15, 1987), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ 
politics/1987/09/15/supreme-court-nominees-rejected-by-the-senate/28a 
be505-180f-423d-a774-adfb861ef2e0/ [https://perma.cc/X8HE-ETB3]. 
218. Supreme Court Nominations (1789–Present), U.S. Senate, https://www. 
senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present
.htm#17 [https://perma.cc/CLP7-26EJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021). In 
addition, Tyler nominees Reuben Walworth, John Spencer, and Edward 
King were variously rejected, postponed, withdrawn, or allowed to lapse, 
but their travails preceded Senate confirmation of Tyler nominee Samuel 
Nelson and so they cannot serve as examples of nominations killed for the 
purpose of holding a vacancy open for the next President. Id.; see also John 
Tyler, History.com, https://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/john-
tyler [https://perma.cc/2XZC-MCBB] (last updated Jul. 9, 2020). 
219. Id.; see also Millard Fillmore, History.com, https://www.history.com/ 
topics/us-presidents/millard-fillmore [https://perma.cc/LY2S-AP9W] (last 
updated Aug. 21, 2018).  
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Stanbery 1,063 days before the end of Johnson’s term. 220  After 
Republican Ulysses Grant became President, Congress increased the 
Supreme Court’s size from seven to nine, effectively handing Grant 
vacancies denied Johnson.221 
These “precedents,” however, are distinguishable in three ways: 
first, they are stale, the latest example having occurred one hundred 
and fifty years before action on the Garland nomination was suspended. 
Resurrecting a practice poised to celebrate the sesquicentennial of its 
disuse may better be characterized as a repudiation of a convention 
against the practice. Second, all four “precedent” Presidents suffered 
electoral legitimacy problems: three were never elected President, and 
the fourth—John Quincy Adams—had been defeated in his bid for 
reelection when he made the nomination. Third, President Obama’s 
nomination of Garland occurred months earlier in the President’s term 
than the failed nominations of Adams, Tyler or Fillmore. Not so with 
Johnson, but legislation that reduced the size of the Court and ended 
Stanbery’s nomination won bipartisan approval in Congress and was 
signed by the President himself, which belies the implication that it was 
a partisan power play to deprive Johnson of his appointment.222 And 
when the Supreme Court was increased from seven to nine during the 
Grant administration, it was for the administrative purpose of restoring 
the traditional parity between the number of circuits and the number 
of justices on the Supreme Court.223 If this was subterfuge, it was well-
hidden, relative to the brazen power play of the Garland episode. 
Indeed, the Senate’s apolitical pretense of tabling the Garland 
nomination so that the electorate could decide which president should 
appoint the next justice, was abandoned four years later, when the 
Senate Republican leadership forged ahead with the confirmation of 
Trump nominee Amy Coney Barrett after Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
died just six weeks before the 2020 presidential election.224  
Beyond the Garland imbroglio, when President Trump took office, 
the Senate Republican majority exercised the so-called “nuclear option” 
to deprive Senate Democrats of the power to filibuster Supreme Court 
 
220. Id.; Stanley I. Kutler, Reconstruction and the Supreme Court: The 
Numbers Game Reconsidered, 32 J. S. Hist. 42, 42, 52 (1966). 
221. U.S. Senate, supra note 218; Kutler, supra note 220, at 42, 52.  
222. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. 
223. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44. 
224. Susan Davis, ‘Shameless’: Senators Still Sparring Over Timing of Supreme 
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nominees,225 six years after a Senate Democratic majority had done the 
same to Senate Republicans in lower court confirmation proceedings.226 
During Judicial Independence 3.0, senators from both parties had 
exploited their filibuster rights to kill nominations of the opposing 
party’s President227—an arguable abuse of the procedural convention 
that the nuclear option ended. At the same time, the Senate rule change 
eliminated a mechanism that ensured a measure of bipartisan consensus 
and compromise before nominees could win confirmation, thereby 
creating a vacuum to be filled by bare-knuckle, majoritarian, partisan 
politics. 
In a similar vein, the Senate Republican majority ended the blue-
slip prerogative.228 In so doing, Senate Democrats were stripped of the 
power to obstruct the confirmation of President Trump’s nominees by 
withholding a blue-slip authorizing floor action on the nominees from 
the Senator’s home state. But it also eliminated the opportunity for 
consultation and consensus that the blue-slip process had historically 
promoted.229 
Finally, President Trump eliminated the American Bar 
Association’s pre-nomination role in vetting judicial candidates. 230 
President George W. Bush had done the same during Judicial 
Independence 3.0, but there were two new twists. First, the role of 
traditional qualifications, upon which ABA ratings are based, was 
diminished in relevance during the Trump administration, as reflected 
in an unprecedented number of Trump nominees being confirmed with 
ABA “not qualified” ratings—including the first two ever at the circuit 
level. 231  Second, to assist it in pre-vetting judicial candidates, the 
 
225. Glenn Thrush, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear” to Speed Up Trump 





228. Sarah Binder, The Senate Confirmed Eric Miller to the 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeals—Despite His Home State Senators’ Objections. That’s New., 




229. When Courts & Congress Collide, supra note 34, at 211. 
230. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges, 
N.Y. Times (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/ 
us/politics/white-house-american-bar-association-judges.html [https://per 
ma.cc/62S8-TCT4]. 
231. Patrick L. Gregory, Trumps Picks More “Not Qualified” Judges, 
Bloomberg Law (Dec. 19, 2018, 10:11 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw. 
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Trump Administration replaced the ABA (which, despite accusations 
of liberal bias, professed ideological neutrality and was expressly 
nonpartisan) with the Federalist Society, an organization with a 
conservative, ideological agenda.232 
With conventions designed to promote consensus, compromise, 
reasoned deliberation, and a focus on traditional qualifications thus 
repudiated, confirmation proceedings have become strangely perfunc–
tory affairs in Judicial Independence 4.0. Nominees have been scheduled 
for hearings en masse, sometimes during legislative recesses, and have 
been confirmed along partisan lines with unprecedented speed for the 
modern era.233 The fractious delays and protracted squabbling that 
characterized the appointments process during Judicial Independence 
3.0, have been replaced with an efficient, partisan assembly-line 
featuring minimal independent Senate scrutiny. 
2. Assault on Court-Packing Conventions 
In 2017, Federalist Society Chairman, Steven G. Calabresi, 
coauthored a memo to both houses of Congress proposing that Congress 
double the size of the federal appellate judiciary for the explicitly 
partisan purpose of packing the circuit courts with conservative judges 




232. David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Courts, Wash. Post (Jan. 2, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/0 
2/feature/conquerors-of-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/JLY7-VEPL]. 
233. Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many 
Federal Appeals Judges as Obama in His First Year, TIME (Dec. 15, 
2017, 2:09 PM), https://time.com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-
record/ [https://perma.cc/7D57-GWMH]; Ariane de Vogue, Senate 
Committee Backs 44 Trump Judicial Nominees Over Democratic 
Objections, CNN (Feb. 7, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/ 
02/07/politics/senate-judicial-nominations/index.html [https://perma.cc 
/2MQG-WEHV]; Nina Totenberg, Republicans Holding Judicial Hearing 
With Senate in Recess, NPR (Oct. 28, 2018, 7:11 AM), https://www.npr. 
org/2018/10/25/660463475/republicans-holding-judicial-hearing-with-sen 
ate-in-recess [https://perma.cc/TU2K-BDJJ]. 
234. Proposed Judgeship Bill from Professor Steven G. Calabresi & Sham Hirji, 
Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. of L., to U.S. Congress (Nov. 7, 2017), available 
at https://archive.thinkprogress.org/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-court-pa 
cking-memo.pdf. In his memo to Congress, Calabresi did not identify 
himself as Federalist Society Chairman nor did he offer the customary 
disclaimer that he was writing in his individual capacity, which had the 
presumably intended effect of adding heft to a proposal that was widely 
reported with explicit reference to his leadership of the Federalist Society. 
See Josh Blackman, Republicans Should Not Pack the Courts, Nat’l Rev. 
(Nov. 27, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/11/ 
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was remarkable in at least two respects. First, this was the 
recommendation of a highly influential player in the world of judicial 
politics: Calabresi was the face of the Federalist Society, which was not 
only the preeminent organization of conservative legal minds in the 
United States—it was, as previously noted, in the President’s inner 
circle, having assumed responsibility for vetting the administration’s 
prospective judicial nominees.235 Second, for the leader of a conservative 
organization ostensibly devoted to interpreting the U.S. Constitution in 
a manner constrained by the original intentions of the founders, the 
proposal represents a seeming break from the Society’s principles. From 
an originalist perspective, exploiting Congressional power to establish 
the lower courts by packing those courts with ideological soulmates for 
the partisan purpose of manipulating the outcomes of the cases the 
courts decide, is in obvious tension with the apolitical, separate and 
independent judiciary that the framers sought to create.236 
The need for the Calabresi proposal was largely mooted by Senate 
rule changes that eliminated procedural impediments to Senate 
Republicans ending the sizable backlog of vacancies created by their 
dilatory tactics in declining to act on President Obama’s nominations.237 
Meanwhile, congressional Democrats and Democratic presidential 
candidates, not to be outdone in the convention-busting derby, 
proposed to neutralize the impact of the Garland ploy by packing the 




235. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. See also, Linda Greenhouse, 
A Conservative Plan to Weaponize the Federal Courts, N.Y. Times (Nov. 
23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/conservatives-
weaponize-federal-courts.html [https://perma.cc/FKF3-36AP]. 
236. Senator William Giles, for example, a Jeffersonian Republican who led 
the only successful effort in American history to unpack the federal courts 
for explicitly partisan purposes, was admirably candid in acknowledging 
that his congressional campaign to disestablish unpopular federal courts 
(and effectively remove their office-holders) exploited gaps in the text of 
the Constitution in a manner that ran counter to the founders’ intentions 
to establish a separate and independent judicial branch: “The theory of 
three distinct departments in government is, perhaps, not critically 
correct . . . although it is obvious that the framers of our constitution 
proceeded on this theory in its formation . . . .” 17 Annals of Cong. 114 
(1808) (statement of William Giles). 
237. Such dilatory tactics were exploited by both political parties throughout 
the Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama Administrations. Russell Wheeler, 
Judicial Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, Brookings 
(Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2013/12/30/ 
judicial-nominations-and-confirmations-fact-and-fiction/ [https://perma. 
cc/KQL3-JENX]. 
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returned to power, and in the aftermath of the 2020 election have 
introduced legislation to do just that.238 
3. Repudiation of Convention Against Delegitimizing Rhetoric 
As described in relation to the emergence of constitutional 
conventions during Judicial Independence 2.0, Presidents have criti–
cized judicial rulings throughout American history and made it clear 
when they thought that a case was wrongly decided.239 With the notable 
exception of Franklin Roosevelt, however, there has been a longstanding 
norm against Presidents resorting to delegitimizing rhetoric that 
impugns the motives, integrity, or competence of the judges themselves. 
Beginning as a Presidential candidate, however, and carrying over into 
his presidency, President Trump defied this convention and repeatedly 
challenged the legitimacy of court rulings adverse to his interests. 
While a Presidential candidate, Trump criticized the presiding 
judge in a fraud case filed against Trump University. At a campaign 
rally, he described the judge as “a hater of Donald Trump,” and a “total 
disgrace,” and claimed that because of his “Mexican heritage,” the 
judge was compromised by an “inherent conflict of interest,” given Mr. 
Trump’s campaign promise to build a wall to deter illegal immigration 
along the Mexican border.240 
As President, he criticized lower court rulings invalidating an 
executive order that restricted travel into the U.S. by citizens of 
predominantly Muslim countries. He described one ruling as the work 
of a “so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away 
from our country.”241 He characterized related rulings by other courts 
as “done by a judge for political reasons,” and as issued by courts that 
 
238. Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems warm to expanding 
Supreme Court, Politico (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico. 
com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https:// 
perma.cc/D3RY-JZUU]; Press Releases, Expand the Supreme Court to 





239. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
240. Daniel White, Donald Trump Ramps Up Attacks Against Judge in Trump 
University Case, Time (June 2, 2016, 8:50 PM), https://time.com/43 
56045/donald-trump-judge-gonzalo-curiel/ [https://perma.cc/CBC2-XY 
JM]. 
241. Steven G. Calabresi, Trump Can Criticize Judges All He Likes. Lincoln 
Did., The Hill (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pun 
dits-blog/the-judiciary/318547-trump-can-criticize-so-called-judges-all-he 
-likes-lincoln [https://perma.cc/7F4V-P599]. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021 
Judicial Independence at Twilight 
1100 
are “slow and political,”242 that “seem to be so political,” and that refuse 
to “do what they should be doing.”243 In response to the same line of 
cases, he expressed dismay that “a judge would put our country in such 
peril . . . . If something happens blame him and court system;”244 and 
again, that “[b]ecause the ban was lifted by a judge, many very bad 
and dangerous people may be pouring into our country. A terrible 
decision.”245 
The President’s attacks on the federal courts reached a crescendo 
in November 2018, when he condemned the adverse ruling of a district 
judge in the Northern District of California as the work of an “Obama 
judge.”246 In a highly unusual move, Chief Justice John Roberts 
rebuked the President. “We do not have Obama judges or Trump 
judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges,” Roberts said in a prepared 
statement. 247  “What we have is an extraordinary group of 
dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those 
appearing before them,” adding that “[t]he independent judiciary 
is something we should all be thankful for.” 248  The President 
promptly rejoined with multiple Tweets: “Sorry Chief Justice John 
Roberts,” the President chided, “but you do indeed have ‘Obama  
242. Garrett Epps, With the Travel Ban, Federal Courts Face a New Legal Issue, 
USA Today (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2017/03/with-the-travel-ban-federal-courts-face-a-new-legal-issue/ 
520200/ [https://perma.cc/P3C2-4NZT]; David Jackson, Trump Seeks 
Quick Supreme Court Review of “Travel Ban”, USA Today (June 5, 2017, 
7:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/05/ 
donald-trump-travel-ban-supreme-court/102509292/ [https://perma.cc/A5 
ZX-BP7A]. 
243. Jacob Pramuk, Trump Defiant on Travel Ban, Blasts the Courts as “So 
Political”, CNBC (Feb. 8, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2017/02/08/trump-defends-his-immigration-order-to-police-claims-courts 
-seem-to-be-so-political.html [https://perma.cc/KT77-394V]. 
244. Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal 
Battles, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/0 
5/us/politics/donald-trump-mike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [https://per 
ma.cc/KT77-394V]. 
245. Matt Zapotosky, Trump Said Dangerous People Might be Pouring in 
Without His Travel Ban. But He’s Not Rushing to Restore It., Wash. Post 




246. Katie Reilly, President Trump Escalates Attacks on “Obama Judges” After 
Rare Rebuke from Chief Justice, TIME (Nov. 21, 2018, 5:19 PM), 
https://time.com/5461827/donald-trump-judiciary-chief-justice-john-rober 
ts/ [https://perma.cc/627F-LA34]. 
247. Id.  
248. Id. 
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judges,’ and they have a much different point of view than the people 
who are charged with the safety of our country.”249 “It would be great 
if the 9th Circuit was indeed an ‘independent judiciary,’” he added, but 
argued that it was not, given the frequency with which administration 
antagonists filed suit there and the rate at which Ninth Circuit decisions 
were reversed. 250  The next day, the President tweeted again, that 
“Justice Roberts can say what he wants, but the 9th Circuit is a 
complete & total disaster. It is out of control, has a horrible reputation, 
is overturned more than any Circuit in the Country.”251 
Some commentators responded to this kerfuffle by dismissing the 
Chief Justice as naïve for claiming that “[w]e have no Obama judges or 
Trump judges,” because Presidents nominate judges with compatible 
ideological outlooks that influence the decisions those judges make 
which, in turn, influences voter choices in presidential elections.252 But 
this argument misses the Chief Justice’s essential point. Yes, the vast 
majority of the public thinks that judges are subject to the influence of 
their political ideologies—an unexceptional manifestation of legal 
realism that social science data corroborate, the public finds 
untroubling, and that the Chief Justice’s statement did not contest.253 




251. Id. A news report on the President’s tweets noted that two other circuits—
the Sixth and the Eleventh—have higher reversal rates than the Ninth. Id. 
252. See, e.g., Marc A. Thiessen, Opinion: Chief Justice Roberts is Wrong. We 
Do Have Obama Judges and Trump Judges, Wash. Post (Nov. 23, 2018, 




253. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged 
the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 L. & Soc’y Rev. 195, 214 
(2011). The Chief Justice’s own confirmation testimony, wherein he asserted 
that judges were like “umpires” who applied but did not make the rules, 
was a piece of political theater that hewed to a naïve formulation of the rule 
of law mantra that social science data has challenged, if not debunked. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
The Chief’s statement here, in contrast, contended only that judges do not 
self-identify as appendages of their appointing Presidents and do their “level 
best” to treat the parties equally—unexceptional claims relating to judges’ 
motivations that attitudinal studies of judicial decision-making do not 
address or contradict. Id.  
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when judges are perceived as brazen, partisan actors. 254  It is the 
difference between honorable judges whose policy perspectives inform 
their understanding of what the law is, and dishonorable judges who 
surreptitiously implement the partisan agenda of the President who 
appointed them. In other words, characterizing judges as partisan 
agents of their appointing President threatens to delegitimize the 
courts, in ways that conceding the influence of political ideology on 
judicial decision-making does not. Empirical support for characterizing 
federal judges and their decision-making in such crassly partisan terms 
is thin—and it was the partisan focus of the President’s critique that 
triggered the Chief Justice’s response. 
4. Testing the Convention Against Defiance of Court Rulings 
One possible end-game strategy in a neo-populist President’s 
campaign to delegitimize the courts is to weaken public trust in the 
judiciary to a point where defying unwelcome court orders becomes 
thinkable. 255  The convention against Presidents openly refusing to 
comply with court orders is relatively muscular, with only one flagrant 
violation in American history—a violation that can be explained in light 
of the exigencies of a wartime emergency that President Lincoln 
confronted.256 To date, Judicial Independence 4.0 has produced no new 
examples—but there has been one close call, in a political culture with 
a history of few close calls. 
The Trump administration proposed to modify the 2020 census by 
adding a question asking respondents whether they were U.S. citizens.257 
 
254. See James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and 
Confirmations: Positivity Theory and Judgments of the Amer–
ican People 123, 125 (2009). 
255. A second end-game strategy—less germane to this sub-section on defiance 
of court orders but nonetheless relevant to the future of judicial inde–
pendence generally—is that a campaign of delegitimizing rhetoric could 
intimidate judges into acquiescence to the President’s will. 
256. See David H. Gans, The President’s Duty to Obey Court Judgments, 
Const. Accountability Ctr. 11 (June 2018), https://www.theus 
constitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Trump-Obey-Court-Judgm 
ents-Issue-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/C84G-P9VD] (explaining how 
Lincoln did not seek to defy the Court in Ex Parte Merryman, but only to 
exercise a wartime exception); see also Abraham Lincoln, Message to 
Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in 4 Collected Works of 
Abraham Lincoln 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasizing 
Lincoln’s argument for an exception in the case of a wartime emergency); 
see generally Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–48 (C.C.D. Md. 
1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that the President lacks the constitutional 
authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and cannot 
authorize a military officer to do so). 
257. Thomas P. Wolf & Brianna Cea, A Critical History of the United States 
Census and Citizenship Questions, 108 Geo. L.J. Online 1, 3 (2019). 
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Critics of the proposal filed multiple suits, claiming that the question 
would discourage immigrants (who lived disproportionately in states 
with Democratic majorities) from participating in the census, which 
would result in undercounting residents in those states, thereby 
frustrating the purpose of the census for the benefit of Republicans 
when legislative districts were redrawn in light of population changes.258 
The administration argued that the question was needed to assist it in 
enforcing the Voting Rights Act. A closely divided Supreme Court, 
however, rejected that justification as a pretext, but allowed for the 
possibility that some other explanation might pass muster.259 
The President called the ruling “ridiculous,” and indicated his 
intention to explore ways in which he might restore the question to the 
census via executive order. 260  The President’s response caused 
speculation that he was poised to defy the Supreme Court’s order.261 
There was room to argue that he was simply exploring alternative, 
legally defensible reasons for adding the citizenship question,262 but that 
argument was undercut by reports of multiple, contradictory rationales 
being floated for including the question against the backdrop of docu–
ments discovered showing that Republican strategists had originally 
proposed to add the question for the illicit purpose of discouraging 
immigrants from participating in the census.263 Suspicions of impending 
 
258. Andrew Prokop, Trump’s Census Citizenship Question Fiasco, Explained, 
Vox (July 11, 2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/11/206 
89015/census-citizenship-question-trump-executive-order [https://perma. 
cc/7WNM-EK9V]. 
259. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019). 
260. Jacqueline Thomsen, Supreme Court Rules Against Trump on Census 
Citizenship Question, The Hill (June 27, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://thehill. 
com/regulation/court-battles/450641-supreme-court-rules-against-trump-a 
dministration-over-census [https://perma.cc/3D4D-WDJZ]; see also Tara 
Bahrampour, Matt Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, Reversing Course, Trump 
Administration Will Look For a Way to Add Citizenship Question to 2020 




261. See, e.g., Jacqueline Thomsen, DOJ Reverses, Says it’s Trying to Find 
Ways to Include Citizenship Question on 2020 Census, The Hill (July 3, 
2019, 5:36 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/451639-doj 
-ordered-to-find-ways-to-include-citizenship-question-on-2020 [https://per 
ma.cc/9DXG-T6DN]; Michael Wines & Adam Liptak, Trump Considering 
an Executive Order to Allow Citizenship Question on Census, N.Y. Times 
(July 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/us/census-question. 
html [https://perma.cc/R5AV-KBZM]. 
262. Thomsen, supra note 260. 
263. JM Rieger, The Trump Administration Changed its Story on the Census 
Citizenship Question 12 Times in Four Months, Wash. Post (July 11, 
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defiance were heightened when the Department of Justice lawyers 
responsible for representing the administration in the matter sought to 
withdraw from the case, which implied the possibility that their client 
was poised to take action that the lawyers could not defend without 
running afoul of their ethical responsibilities.264 One presiding judge 
denied the request of counsel to withdraw,265 another declined to permit 
them to do so without a written explanation,266 and the administration 
ultimately relented.267 
Professors Josh Chafetz and David Pozen argue that when a 
convention withstands challenge, in situations such as this, it emerges 
stronger and more entrenched.268 To that extent, this episode arguably 
strengthened rather than jeopardized the convention against presi–
dential defiance of court orders. With history as a guide, I agree that 
conventions which survive periodic stress tests emerge renewed, and 
that if the nation moves on from its current neo-populist romance with 
the census case as the only test of the convention against defiance, the 
same will hold true here. But for a President who repeatedly revisited 
and revised his public positions and policy pronouncements, calling this 
episode a win for the convention rather than a worry for the future is 
akin to the people of ancient Pompeii celebrating the end of Vesuvius’s 
first rumble. 
In sum, during Judicial Independence 4.0, democracy fatigue, 
paired with a swell of anti-elitism, has engendered a political 
 
2019, 8:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/08/ 
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-ZMUJ]. See also Prokop, supra note 258. 
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S5-BVQY]; see also President Trump Remarks on Census Citizenship 
Question, C-SPAN (July 11, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?4625 
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268. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 
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atmosphere leading the United States to join a world-wide movement 
toward a more polarized, autocratic, and populist leadership that has 
little patience for an independent judiciary impeding its agenda. These 
developments, which followed generations of heightening skepticism 
over the putative role of an independent judiciary in the ROLP, have 
culminated in the disruption, and sometimes the repudiation, of 
longstanding judicial-independence conventions, and placed the future 
of customary independence in jeopardy. 
IV. Envisioning Judicial Independence 5.0 
Judicial Independence 3.0 eroded support for the traditional role of 
an independent judiciary in the ROLP, and in so doing rendered the 
conventions that had long protected judicial independence more 
vulnerable to cyclical attack. Judicial Independence 4.0 corresponds to 
the arrival of the latest cycle, which arose following the transition of 
power from the Obama to the Trump administrations. I have 
denominated Judicial Independence 4.0 as such because it poses a new 
and more potent threat to an independent judiciary, having disrupted 
or repudiated long-respected constitutional conventions that withstood 
challenge in prior cycles of court-directed anger. With the future of an 
independent judiciary in doubt, the compound question becomes 
whether judicial independence is worth saving, and if so, how? 
Insofar as the collapse of independence conventions in stage 4.0 was 
facilitated by protracted erosion of support for the role of judicial 
independence in the ROLP during 3.0, the search for solutions must 
begin with the ailing ROLP. Without a defensible paradigm to 
galvanize support for an independent judiciary, the political will to 
restore independence conventions lacks raison d’être. In the meantime, 
however, independence conventions have been set aside, and a period 
of bare-knuckle, partisan judicial politics is upon us. Long-term 
strategies for the restoration of independence conventions guided by a 
more sustainable paradigm must therefore be coupled with short-term 
strategies for transitioning from the relative chaos of convention-free 
politics that Judicial Independence 4.0 has wrought. 
A. A New Legal Culture Paradigm269 
During Judicial Independence 3.0, a series of developments 
converged to challenge, if not debunk, a premise at the core of the 
ROLP: that independent judges impartially uphold the law, impervious 
to extralegal influences. One possible response to this generations-long 
turn of events is to allow the crumbling edifice of judicial independence 
to collapse under its own weight and accept the inevitability of a 
judiciary that is more responsive to partisan and majoritarian pressures. 
 
269. For an initial stab at the Legal Culture Paradigm that I propose here, see 
generally Geyh, supra note 44, at 76–100. 
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Such a response makes sense if judicial independence is to blame for its 
own undoing—if its foundation is too antiquated to be salvageable. If, 
however, as I argue here, the problem lies not with judicial 
independence itself, but with how judicial independence has been 
conceptualized in the context of the ROLP, then the solution is not to 
jettison judicial independence but to rework the paradigm itself. 
I begin from an unexceptional premise that is compatible with the 
ROLP: in the Unites States’ version of a representative democracy that 
is committed to the rule of law, the judiciary’s role is to uphold 
applicable law on a case-by-case basis. Accepting that premise, there 
are two potentially deleterious sources of interference with judicial 
decision-making. One is external: the role of the judiciary is undermined 
if outsiders influence judges to disregard the law via resort to carrots 
or sticks. The other is internal: the role of the judiciary is undermined 
if judges disregard the law by indulging their own ideological or other 
biases. The paradox embedded in the ROLP is that judicial 
independence, in the form of structural safeguards against outside 
interference with judicial decision-making, protects against distortions 
of law from external sources, at the same time as it exacerbates the 
potential for distortions of law from internal sources by eliminating 
controls on judicial decision-making that could deter bias. 
This paradox results from an unduly parsimonious conception of 
judicial independence. The ROLP focuses on structural mechanisms, 
such as tenure and salary protections, aided by constitutional conven–
tions, which buffer judges from external sources of interference with 
impartial judicial decision-making (“structural independence”), while 
paying insufficient heed to judicial independence from internal sources 
of interference with judicial behavior (“behavioral independence”).270 In 
a theoretical vacuum, structural independence enables behavioral 
dependence, insofar as freedom from external controls on judicial 
decision-making liberates judges to satiate their internal biases without 
fear of consequence. The long, slow erosion of support for the ROLP 
during Judicial Independence 3.0 is in large part attributable to the 
paradigm’s failure to come to terms with the need for behavioral 
independence, and the extent to which the muscular, structural 
independence that the paradigm embraces can beget a form of 
behavioral dependence that social science has documented. 
Proponents of the ROLP have addressed the behavioral-dependence 
problem by positing it out of existence: independent judges disregard 
their extralegal predilections and uphold the law—full stop. Apart from 
flying in the face of empirical research and public opinion, this 
proposition is hopelessly counterintuitive: in what parallel universe does 
a decision-maker’s independence from external control incentivize that 
decision-maker to disregard her own biases when making decisions? The 
 
270. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Independence as an Organizing Principle, 
10 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 185, 190–91 (2014). 
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ROLPers have countered social science, public opinion, and common 
sense with a hapless bromide, and it should surprise no one that they 
are losing the argument. 
To the extent that judges do exhibit behavioral independence and 
uphold the law regardless of their own policy preferences, it is not due 
to structural independence from external sources of control over their 
decision-making by itself. It is because judges are predisposed to bracket 
out their extralegal predilections and follow the law for other reasons—
reasons that structural independence protects from encroachment. 
Those “other reasons” are supplied by the legal culture in which judges 
are entrenched. 
In proposing a Legal Culture Paradigm, I borrow from anth–
ropology to define “culture” as a “set of shared, signifying practices—
practices by which meaning is produced, performed, contested, or 
transformed.”271 Next, in thinking about a distinct legal culture, I steer 
clear of innumerable “signifying practices” that are debatable or 
ephemeral and bear down on three essential, enduring, and less 
contestable practices that constitute tenets of the Legal Culture 
Paradigm. 
First, judges are acculturated to take law seriously. This 
commitment to law begins in law school and continues in practice, 
where sound legal analysis and argumentation, (putatively) uncorr–
upted by feelings and personal beliefs, are the coin of the realm. The 
primacy of law in resolving legal problems is reflected in the law school 
curriculum, which is top-heavy with courses on substantive and 
procedural law; Socratic dialogues, where students are guided by their 
faculty to sort wheat from chaff and divine the law upon which cases 
and problems turn; law school exams, which test the student’s 
command of law in its application to hypothetical fact patterns; the bar 
exam, which is a veritable trivia test on substantive and procedural 
law; and litigation practice, where motions practice and brief writing 
proceed from the premise that applicable facts in relation to operative 
law are of paramount importance. Social science corroborates the 
intuition that the legal culture’s fixation on substantive and procedural 
law affects how law students and lawyers (who later become judges) 
think about and resolve legal problems.272 
 
271. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, in Cultural Studies, Cultural 
Analysis, and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism 37, 42 
(Austen D. Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003). 
272. Lief H. Carter & Thomas F. Burke, Reason in Law 8 (6th ed. 2002); 
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on 
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337, 
1409–10 (1997); James R. P. Ogloff, David R. Lyon, Kevin S. Douglas & 
V. Gordon Rose, More than “Learning to Think Like a Lawyer:” The 
Empirical Research on Legal Education, 34 Creighton L. Rev. 73, 111 
(2000); Eileen Braman, Law, Politics, and Perception: How Policy 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021 
Judicial Independence at Twilight 
1108 
Second, likewise beginning in law school and continuing in practice, 
future judges are exposed to pervasive legal indeterminacy. Indeter–
minacy is inherent in difficult cases, where a legal issue is one of first 
impression; where a statute’s meaning in its application to the facts of 
the case is ambiguous; where judicial precedents conflict or are unclear; 
or where operative law affords judges the discretion to reach different 
conclusions. “Learning to think like a lawyer,” which law schools tout 
as their mission, is an exercise in critical thinking. Law students are 
disabused of their natural inclination to accept judicial opinions at face 
value, and are trained to challenge the assumptions, logic, and 
conclusions of those opinions. That exercise enables fledgling lawyers to 
exploit indeterminacy by seeing and arguing “both sides” of difficult 
legal questions (divorced from their own policy preferences), to the end 
of making themselves more effective advocates for their clients in an 
adversarial system of justice. 
Third, future judges—again beginning as law students—seek to 
resolve indeterminate legal questions with reference to competing policy 
arguments that aid them in deciding which of two comparably plausible 
interpretations of law is best. Different maxims of interpretation can 
lead to different results;273 the interests of fairness and justice may be 
in tension with the interests of predictability and efficiency; interpreting 
law with recourse to its plain meaning, original intent, primary purpose, 
or a need to avoid absurd results may yield different outcomes; and the 
dictates of prudence can lead judges to think strategically and resolve 
some indeterminate questions but not others. When judges are called 
upon to decide indeterminate legal questions with reference to 
competing policy arguments, the argument they find most persuasive 
can be informed by their background, education, life experience, 
common sense, and policy perspective, aided by a strategic sense for 
the political context in which the case arose. 
These three practices core to the legal culture corroborate and 
qualify components of the ROLP. Behavioral independence—
manifested as a predisposition to resolve legal questions with reference 
to operative law, divorced from personal attitudes—is a practice 
inculcated into judges as an essential part of the legal culture in which 
they are immersed. Structural independence promotes behavioral 
independence and the rule of law by buffering judges from external 
pressure to disregard what the first signifying practice of their legal 
culture predisposes them to do: take law seriously. Such a claim is 
simplest to defend in the context of easy cases. Easy cases receive less 
 
Preferences Influence Legal Reasoning 164 (2009); Mark A. 
Graber, A New Introduction to American Constitutionalism 93 
(2013). 
273. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. 
Rev. 395, 401–06 (1950). 
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attention, because they are less interesting, but American law is top-
heavy with matters that lawyers decline to take because their 
prospective clients’ claims are meritless; matters in which suit is 
threatened but never filed, filed but never litigated, or litigated but 
never tried, because the law is unambiguous and the outcome clear; and 
matters in which trial judges make demonstrable errors, or litigants and 
their lawyers have their judgment clouded by emotion, ego, avarice, or 
confusion, leading to easy appeals generating unanimous outcomes.274 
Structural independence from external sources of interference with 
impartial judicial decision-making facilitates the rule of law in easy 
cases by enabling judges to uphold and apply the law as they have been 
acculturated to do throughout their legal careers, without fear or favor 
clouding their judgment. 
In the context of easy cases, then, the culturally embedded practice 
of taking law seriously helps to justify the traditional role of judicial 
independence in a new, Legal Culture Paradigm. In hard cases, the 
same analysis sometimes applies. For example, in cases made difficult 
because the law is complex or the facts are convoluted, structural 
independence buffers judges from external sources of pressure and gives 
them the breathing room to get to the bottom of the matter and reach 
the correct result. Many difficult cases, however, are made difficult 
because the applicable law in relation to the operative facts is not just 
complicated—it is indeterminate. In such cases, judges have no choice 
but to make new law by filling interpretive gaps in existing law. In the 
context of an adversarial system, that typically puts judges in the 
position of deciding which of two competing, and often comparably 
plausible, arguments yield the sounder interpretation of applicable law. 
That is a kind of policy choice requiring discretion and judgment that 
can be informed by the judge’s life experience, education, background 
(including race and gender), common sense, and ideological orientation, 
aided by a strategic appreciation for the political context in which the 
law was written and the case arose. 
When judges are called upon to make new law in hard cases because 
existing law is indeterminate in its application to the facts before the 
court, there is no denying that judges make legal policy. And social 
science shows that when making legal policy in such cases, judges can 
be influenced by their ideological orientations, among other extralegal 
 
274. Richard Posner, for example, has observed that “most cases are routine,” 
and that “[t]he routine case is dispatched with least fuss by legalist 
methods.” Richard Posner, How Judges Think 46 (2010); see 
also Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical 
Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate 
Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) (“When the relevant legal 
materials are uncomplicated, the issues are uncontroversial, and precedent 
is clear, judges’ deliberations are straightforward and judgments are easily 
reached.”). 
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factors. This is inevitable. As Professor Stephen Burbank has wisely 
observed, law and judicial politics are “different sides of the same coin. 
They are not opposites, but rather complements,”275 because extralegal 
considerations inform the policy perspectives that judges bring to bear 
when acting in a law-making role. 
The question then becomes whether judicial “policy-makers,” who 
are subject to extralegal influences in their policy-making role, should 
receive a measure of independence from popular and political influences 
that policy-makers in the legislative and executive branches neither 
enjoy nor deserve. The ROLP is helpless to answer this question 
because it disavows the notion that independent judges make policy or 
are subject to extralegal influence. 
The Legal Culture Paradigm, in contrast, accommodates the 
empirical realities that the ROLP posits away and answers this question 
in the affirmative. The ripple effects of judicial policy-making can be 
widely felt, given the precedential effect of court rulings, but the fact 
remains that judges are called upon to say what the law is in the context 
of specific cases or controversies. The outcome of any given case turns 
on the application of law to the particular facts of the case before the 
court—facts and law with which the judge is familiar by virtue of the 
manner in which the adversarial process supplies judges with the 
specifics needed to make an informed decision. What structural 
independence enables in hard cases, then, is a judge’s best assessment 
of what the applicable facts and law require, unpolluted by external 
threats or manipulations—an assessment that the judge is uniquely 
situated and fully acculturated to make. Insofar as that assessment 
unavoidably requires the judge to “make policy” by determining how 
uncertainties in applicable law should be resolved to decide a specific 
case before the court, it is fully informed, fact-driven, policy-making 
that is better suited to achieve just results on a case-by-case basis than 
if the judge was subject to the control of actors less familiar with the 
facts or law and concerned only with the outcome. 
So conceived, this form of judicial policy-making is inevitable and 
unproblematic. In economics, the term “frictional unemployment” is 
used to describe the unavoidable percentage of workers who are between 
jobs or first entering the workforce, and whose unemployment is a 
natural and inevitable part of a healthy economy performing 
normally.276 In a similar vein, I would characterize routine judicial law 
making in hard cases as frictional policy-making—the place where law 
and policy unavoidably converge and require good judges to offer their 
best assessment of what the law requires, aided by a range of extralegal 
 
275. Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, 
Politics, Science, and Humility, in What’s Law Got to Do with It? 
41, 51 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011). 
276. Ronald S. Warren, Jr., The Estimation of Frictional Unemployment: A 
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considerations (including ideology) that inform their discretion and 
judgment. This is not judging gone rogue. It is judging done right. 
The Legal Culture Paradigm, then, tweaks the ROLP in two 
important ways. First, it explains how a distinct legal culture gives rise 
to a default in favor of behavioral independence from internal sources 
of interference with impartial judicial decision-making—a default that 
structural independence helps to preserve and protect from external 
distortion. Second, the Legal Culture Paradigm comes to terms with 
legal indeterminacy and the role that a judge’s ideology (among other 
extralegal considerations) plays in resolving indeterminate legal 
questions, to the end of rejecting the widely discredited premise of the 
ROLP that independent judges are impervious to extralegal influences 
and do no more or less than follow the law. 
The virtue of a Legal Culture Paradigm is that it defends an 
independent judiciary in terms consonant with social science and public 
perception. The potential vice is that by acknowledging the role 
ideology plays in frictional policy-making, the Legal Culture Paradigm 
must also acknowledge the risk of gratuitous policy-making, in which 
judges abuse their structural independence by disregarding the law 
(knowingly or not) that they are acculturated to follow, and effectively 
usurping power by imposing their own policy predilections. 
Accordingly, the Legal Culture Paradigm must welcome a more robust 
role for judicial accountability, relative to the ROLP, to deter 
gratuitous policy-making. 
Ramping up the role of accountability creates a conundrum. 
Behavioral dependence manifested in gratuitous policy-making can be 
managed by holding judges more accountable for their internal biases. 
Constraining behavioral dependence in this way, however, invites 
incursions on structural independence, insofar as those who control the 
structures employed to curb judicial bias can misappropriate those 
structures to bend judges to their will, on the pretext of constraining 
behavioral dependence. 
This conundrum is manageable, however, for three reasons. First, 
independence and accountability are in a perpetual state of constructive 
tension. Striking the optimal balance between them is a fluid process. 
Acquiescing to an additional measure of accountability is a reasonable 
price to pay for preserving the essential character of an independent 
judiciary that Judicial Independence 3.0 has imperiled. One must 
therefore accept that preserving the judiciary’s legitimacy with the 
body politic necessitates a measure of political-branch oversight. The 
nomination and confirmation of federal judges has always been a 
partisan, political affair, and in a post-realist age, the continuing 
relevance of a judge’s ideology in the appointments process is inevitable. 
Defenders of an independent judiciary must likewise accept, if not 
embrace, the role Congress plays in regulating judicial bias, by means 
of disqualification statutes; financial disclosure laws (which can expose 
conflicts of interest that beget bias); the Judicial Conduct and 
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Disability Act, which delineates the scope of discipline for judicial mis–
conduct that can implicate behavioral dependence;277 and, in extreme 
cases of partiality manifested in bribery or other crimes or corruption, 
the impeachment processes. 
Second, the proposed Legal Culture Paradigm is compatible with 
the existing constitutional structure and the conventions that have 
emerged and evolved over time to limit untoward incursions on the 
judiciary’s structural independence. The Legal Culture Paradigm thus 
embraces customary independence, which will continue to push back 
against unwarranted political-branch encroachments on judicial 
independence. 
Third, the additional accountability that the Legal Culture 
Paradigm envisions can be supplied, in large part, by intra-judicial 
mechanisms that need not impinge on customary independence. The 
judiciary self-regulates for behavioral dependence in myriad ways: 
1) appellate review of bias-induced errors;278 2) mandamus actions to 
thwart judicial usurpations of power;279 3) disqualification processes 
that force the withdrawal of judges whose impartiality is in doubt;280 
4) procedural rules that structure and limit problematic exercise of 
judicial discretion;281 5) the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, which 
regulates judicial partiality and partisan political conduct;282 6) the 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, whereby Congress authorized 
circuit judicial councils to discipline judges for behavior prejudicial to 
the effective administration of the courts;283 7) the oath of office, which 
calls upon judges to act impartially and uphold the U.S. Constitution;284 
and 8) informal norms among judges desirous of mutual respect on 
 
277. The Act does not regulate conduct related to the merits of rulings that 
judges issue, 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(2) (2018), but can address extra–
judicial conduct that casts doubt on the judge’s capacity to serve as an 
impartial adjudicator. 
278. See, e.g., Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 
100 Cal. L. Rev. 1479, 1480–81 (2012). 
279. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). 
280. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2018). 
281. For example, there are explicit, rule-based constraints on a federal judge’s 
discretion to grant dispositive motions for failure to state a claim, summary 
judgment, and a directed verdict (“judgment as a matter of law”). Gene 
R. Shreve, Peter Raven-Hansen & Charles Gardner Geyh, 
Understanding Civil Procedure 212–13, 345, 401–02 (6th ed. 2019). 
282. 2 U.S. Courts, Ethics and Judicial Conduct: Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges, Canons 3, 5 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective
_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P2U-Y43R].  
283. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2018). 
284. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018). 
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collegial courts, which discourage partisan judging contrary to the rule 
of law mission.285 By highlighting the relevance of these mechanisms to 
judicial accountability, and reforming some to better serve their 
purpose, the judiciary itself can go a long way toward preserving its 
autonomy in the transition to a Legal Culture Paradigm. 
B. A Litigation-Like Strategy for Restoring Constitutional Conventions 
Implementing the proposed Legal Culture Paradigm should help to 
meet the challenge presented by eroding support for the ROLP in 
Judicial Independence 3.0. But the Legal Culture Paradigm is 
inadequate to the task of overcoming the threat to the constitutional 
order posed by Judicial Independence 4.0. That is because the Legal 
Culture Paradigm depends for its success on preserving customary 
independence by respecting constitutional conventions that are being 
trashed in the service of dueling campaigns to promote or thwart the 
neo-populist wave that is sweeping the United States and much of the 
world in Judicial Independence 4.0. It is unrealistic to hope that a 
modest reboot of the prevailing paradigm can, by itself, quiet the 
polarized, partisan, political fury firing Judicial Independence 4.0, 
because the judiciary and its independence have become little more 
than pawns subject to sacrifice in a chess game for the future of 
American Democracy. 
Those seeking to defend or destroy the new populist order are akin 
to parties in high-stakes litigation. Litigants in contentious cases often 
begin with a period of hardball, followed by a period of growing 
receptivity to settlement. A similar sequence of events seems likely here. 
Throughout American history, there have been cycles of anti-Court 
anger following major transitions of political power, in which holdover 
judges of the old regime become targets of the new regime.286 The first 
two cycles of the twentieth century were related: the conservative 
Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence thwarted the 
legislative agenda of angry Progressives as they ascended to power in 
the early twentieth century, just as that same jurisprudence impeded 
and infuriated the New Dealers a generation later.287 The end of the 
latter cycle was punctuated (in part) by the Supreme Court’s famous 
footnote 4 in Carolene Products, where the Court signaled its intentions 
to reserve heightened due process scrutiny for cases in which legislation 
 
285. Harry T. Edwards, Collegial Decision Making in the US Courts of Appeals 
26–28 (N.Y.U. Sch. L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 17–47, 2017). 
286. Geyh, supra note 129, at 19–21. 
287. See Ross, supra note 127, at 1 (characterizing FDR’s attacks on courts 
during the New Deal as a “culmination” of the anticourt sentiment that 
began a generation earlier, during the Populist-Progressive era). 
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and other state action impinged upon the rights of discrete and insular 
minorities.288 
The net effect of this pivot was to withdraw the Court from 
protecting the property rights of businesses by second-guessing the 
wisdom of socio-economic legislation enacted by historically liberal-
leaning legislatures and to shift the Court’s focus toward protecting the 
civil rights and liberties of political minorities against infringement by 
majoritarian—and often more conservative—state interests. 289  As a 
consequence of this shift, the next three cycles of anti-Court sentiment 
featured angry conservatives taking aim at more liberal federal courts: 
1) attacks on the Warren Court by state and federal officials, in the 
1960s;290 2) the congressional Republicans’ campaign against “liberal 
judicial activism” in the 1990s;291 and 3) President Trump’s effort to 
discredit “political” decision-making by “Obama judges,” described in 
this article.292 
These conservative campaigns against liberal judges in the modern 
era featured fundamentally different strategies by the partisan 
participants. Republicans went on the offensive. They made recreating 
the courts as champions of selective “judicial restraint”—whose judges 
shared judicial philosophies that were more in keeping conservative 
partisan interests—a centerpiece of the Republican agenda dating back 
to the Reagan administration.293 It was then, across a series of policy 
papers, that the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy devised 
a blueprint for an ideological regime change in American constitutional 
law—a change that could best be implemented through the 
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Court from predominately protecting property rights to protecting other 
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290. See William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials: A 
Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 483, 
528–52 (2002). 
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292. See supra text accompanying notes 246–251. 
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appointments process.294 In the decades since, Republican Presidents 
have often shorthanded this ambition in terms of appointing justices in 
the mold of Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.295 Democrats, in 
contrast, adopted a more passive and defensive approach.296 They came 
to regard the federal courts as allies in the cause of protecting the rights 
that liberals held dear (even after the Supreme Court began its turn to 
the right) and, instead of campaigning aggressively to establish a liberal 
Court, were content to join moderates in defending the judiciary’s 
independence from cyclical, conservative assault.297 
The net effect has been a manifestation of what Joseph Fishkin and 
David Pozen describe as “asymmetric constitutional hardball,”298 in 
which conservatives have (with exceptions299) tested the limits of inde–
pendence conventions more aggressively than their liberal counterparts. 
In that regard, however, Judicial Independence 4.0, beginning with the 
Merrick Garland imbroglio and its aftermath, show signs of being a 
game-changer. Progressives are awakening to the realization that after 
successfully abrogating an array of constitutional conventions, their 
conservative adversaries are poised to “win” a generations-long battle 
 
294. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on 
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Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
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ps://perma.cc/8RUK-K47M] (reporting that Kay Daly, President of the 
conservative Coalition for a Fair Judiciary, said, “The president has made 
an excellent choice today which reflects his commitment to appoint judges 
in the mold of Scalia and Thomas”); Ariane De Vogue, How the 
Presidential Election Might Change Supreme Court, ABC News (Nov. 5, 
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the mold of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito.’”). 
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for ideological control of the Supreme Court. Sensing a major 
jurisprudential regime change,300 progressives have begun to return to 
their roots, by launching an offensive in the spirit of their forbearers 
from the Progressive and New Deal eras. Most notable in that regard 
are serious proposals by leading Democrats to pack the Supreme Court 
with additional justices to offset recent Republican gains, in derogation 
of longstanding conventions against changing Supreme Court size for 
partisan purposes.301 
For those who value the role that independence conventions play 
in promoting the orderly operation of government generally and the 
future of an independent judiciary in particular, things are likely to get 
worse before they can get better. Pokes to the eye of established 
conventions by conservative partisans will elicit reciprocal pokes by 
progressive partisans in lieu of unheeded warnings not to poke at all. 
This “eye for an eye” stratagem is very much in the spirit of aggressive, 
high-stakes civil litigation, in which both sides strain and sometimes 
exceed the limits of applicable rules in scorched-Earth campaigns to 
exhaust and intimidate their opponents in pursuit of tactical advantage. 
In this environment, calls for compromise and détente will almost 
certainly go unheeded. The conservative, neo-populist wave has gained 
ground by means of tactics it has no incentive to discontinue. 
Progressives, who have lost ground, are in no mood to seek a truce that 
entrenches their diminished position. In the immediate future, then, a 
period of unrestrained hardball appears inevitable.302 
Ultimately, however, scorched-Earth litigation is difficult to 
sustain. It becomes so disruptive, so expensive, and so exhausting, that 
settlement options begin to look more attractive to both sides. In a like 
vein, operating a government in which political branch relationships 
with the judiciary are unregulated by conventions portends to become 
hopelessly chaotic and dangerously destabilizing. Paradoxically, therein 
 
300. See generally Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential 
Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305 
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301. See Everett & Levine, supra note 238. 
302. Fishkin and Pozen doubt whether Democrats are fit to play hardball into 
extra innings, noting that they have lacked the philosophical and financial 
resolve of their Republican counterparts. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 298, 
at 976–82. The accuracy of that prediction may turn on whether Judicial 
Independence 4.0 yields the major jurisprudential regime change that 
Republicans have been seeking since the Reagan administration. If it does 
not, then Fishkin and Pozen are probably right. If, however, we are at a 
turning point that culminates in a more significant jurisprudential shift on 
the Supreme Court, the history of the left’s protracted assault on the federal 
courts during the Populist, Progressive, and New Deal eras suggests that 
the Democrats will be playing hardball with sustained intensity into the 
foreseeable future. 
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lies hope: the more insufferable the unrelenting game of unrestrained 
hardball gets, the more attractive the alternative of settlement becomes. 
Looking ahead, it is important to begin the business of putting a 
structure in place to facilitate the negotiated settlement of differences 
between the institutional disputants in anticipation of a time when they 
will be receptive to such efforts. A key to enabling a negotiated or 
mediated settlement is to bring the parties together in a quieter and 
less formal setting, to promote candor and discourage posturing for the 
benefit of external audiences. 
 Separation of powers coupled with checks and balances 
entrench inefficiency and conflict in the constitutional design. But the 
inefficiency and conflict that the constitution contemplates does not 
require isolation or alienation. Since the founding, thoughtful observers 
have proposed ways to harness constructive, interbranch engagement 
to serve a variety of ends. At the Constitutional Convention, James 
Madison proposed a Council of Revision that called upon a body 
constituted of the President and federal judges to “examine every act 
of the National Legislature before it shall operate.”303 In the 1920s, 
Benjamin Cardozo proposed a Ministry of Justice made up of 
representatives from the bench, bar, and academy to assist legislatures 
in recommending reforms to improve the administration of justice.304 
Many others have offered similar proposals in the years since.305 
Congress has established several ad hoc, multi-branch commissions 
for the explicit purpose of facilitating effective administration of the 
courts. In 1972, Congress established the Commission on Revision of 
the Federal Court Appellate System, consisting of members appointed 
by the President, the Chief Justice, and both houses of Congress, to 
assess the need for realignment of the circuit courts.306 In 1988, Congress 
established the Federal Courts Study Committee, with members 
appointed by the Chief Justice and drawn from all three branches of 
government, for the purpose of identifying problems with federal court 
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operations and recommending solutions.307 In 1990, Congress created 
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, with 
members appointed by leaders from all three branches of government, 
to examine issues related to judicial impeachment and discipline, and 
recommend reforms.308 
Of most immediate relevance, beginning in the late 1970s, the 
Brookings Institution hosted a series of conferences in Williamsburg, 
Virginia, and elsewhere.309 These conferences brought representatives 
from all three branches of government together to discuss court-related 
issues for the purpose of improving interbranch communication and 
promoting mutual understanding of challenges confronting the 
judiciary.310 
I recommend that three tri-branch summits be convened in the 
spirit of the Williamsburg conferences, when the participants are willing 
and receptive to meet. One summit could address core principles: the 
paradigmatic role of an independent and accountable judiciary in 
American government. A second summit could assess the state of 
constitutional conventions that have served to protect an independent 
judiciary from encroachment. And a third could examine the 
appointments process and the role of procedural conventions in 
promoting a stable system of selection and an independent, accountable 
judiciary. 
At first blush, ending this article with a proposal for the disputants 
to get together and talk through their differences would seem to rival 
making s’mores and sharing puppy memes as a toothless, anodyne 
solution to addressing the debilitating problems that have beset the 
American judiciary. But I have analogized this proposal to settlement 
talks in high-stakes litigation for a reason. Settlement talks are not 
warm and fuzzy affairs. They are intense and fraught, because both 
sides are fully aware that their futures are at stake. For that reason, 
the concessions that parties make in a negotiated settlement have 
purpose and bite. The challenge, which this article has sought to meet, 
is to make plain, for the benefit of the disputants, that the stakes are 
comparably high in the ongoing partisan battle for the future of the 
American judiciary. 
By the same token, as in settlement negotiations, the success of 
talks between partisans struggling for control of the courts does not 
depend on the naïve hope that the disputants will set self-interest aside 
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and act for the greater good. As welcome as such displays of patriotism 
might be, détente and a restoration of independence conventions can 
be achieved with recourse to enlightened self-interest, and the adage, 
“what goes around, comes around.” Forging consensus in support of 
constitutional conventions proceeds from the self-interested premise 
that acquiescing to standard operating procedures, which yields certain 
tactical advantages to my opponent when I am in power today, not 
only makes life less exhausting and chaotic, but will afford me those 
same tactical advantages when I am out of power tomorrow. Support 
for judicial independence proceeds on a similar, self-interested premise: 
the “optimal” scenario of judges whom I bend to my will when I am in 
power today, will yield to the catastrophic scenario of judges whom my 
opponent bends to his will tomorrow, unless we settle on independent 
judges as the second-best bet for us both. The key, in other words, is 
to reorient self-interest in terms that look beyond the next election 
cycle.  
Conclusion 
Judicial independence is in a twilight that can presage the darkness 
or herald the dawn. This article offers ample cause for pessimism and 
predictions of a dark future for judicial independence, but there is also 
cause for guarded optimism. Changes generations in the making, which 
have heightened public skepticism of an independent judiciary in the 
rule of law paradigm, can be arrested with the gradual introduction of 
a new Legal Culture Paradigm. The independence conventions that a 
conservative neo-populist President and his progressive (and sometimes 
neo-populist) opponents have sought to repudiate can be restored 
following a period of turmoil, as the neo-populist movement loses 
momentum and the disputants become more receptive to détente. 
Darkness may be nigh, but there is room to hope that the dawn will 
follow. 
 
